From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1210CEB64D9 for ; Thu, 15 Jun 2023 08:39:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238942AbjFOIj1 (ORCPT ); Thu, 15 Jun 2023 04:39:27 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:59234 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S244351AbjFOIjO (ORCPT ); Thu, 15 Jun 2023 04:39:14 -0400 Received: from mail-io1-f77.google.com (mail-io1-f77.google.com [209.85.166.77]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 47AFE296B for ; Thu, 15 Jun 2023 01:39:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-io1-f77.google.com with SMTP id ca18e2360f4ac-77ac656cae6so808814539f.2 for ; Thu, 15 Jun 2023 01:39:09 -0700 (PDT) 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x59-20020a0294c1000000b004231093c805mr731017jah.3.1686818348544; Thu, 15 Jun 2023 01:39:08 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2023 01:39:08 -0700 In-Reply-To: <000000000000cbb5f505faa4d920@google.com> X-Google-Appengine-App-Id: s~syzkaller X-Google-Appengine-App-Id-Alias: syzkaller Message-ID: <000000000000773bb005fe270004@google.com> Subject: Re: [syzbot] [f2fs?] possible deadlock in f2fs_release_file From: syzbot To: chao@kernel.org, jaegeuk@kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on: HEAD commit: b6dad5178cea Merge tag 'nios2_fix_v6.4' of git://git.kerne.. git tree: upstream console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12510203280000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=5bcee04c3b2a8237 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e5b81eaab292e00e7d98 compiler: gcc (Debian 10.2.1-6) 10.2.1 20210110, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=10db66f7280000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=14577753280000 Downloadable assets: disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/0ae77e66553b/disk-b6dad517.raw.xz vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/5b2da4d23e74/vmlinux-b6dad517.xz kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/23130b8e7a8a/bzImage-b6dad517.xz mounted in repro: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/70b8358ae62a/mount_0.gz IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: syzbot+e5b81eaab292e00e7d98@syzkaller.appspotmail.com loop4: rw=2049, sector=77824, nr_sectors = 3048 limit=63271 syz-executor110: attempt to access beyond end of device loop4: rw=2049, sector=80872, nr_sectors = 1048 limit=63271 ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-00037-gb6dad5178cea #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor110/5218 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88806676b660 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#17){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:775 [inline] ffff88806676b660 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#17){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_release_file fs/f2fs/file.c:1866 [inline] ffff88806676b660 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#17){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_release_file+0xca/0x100 fs/f2fs/file.c:1856 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802100c448 (&sbi->node_write){++++}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_down_read fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2087 [inline] ffff88802100c448 (&sbi->node_write){++++}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x166e/0x19d0 fs/f2fs/data.c:2842 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&sbi->node_write){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5419 [inline] lock_release+0x33c/0x670 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5725 up_write+0x2a/0x520 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625 f2fs_up_write fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2122 [inline] block_operations+0xca4/0xe80 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1288 f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x5fa/0x4b40 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1651 __write_checkpoint_sync fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1768 [inline] __checkpoint_and_complete_reqs+0xea/0x350 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1787 issue_checkpoint_thread+0xe3/0x250 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1818 kthread+0x344/0x440 kernel/kthread.c:379 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 -> #1 (&sbi->cp_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x9c/0x480 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1520 f2fs_down_read fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2087 [inline] f2fs_lock_op fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2130 [inline] f2fs_convert_inline_inode+0x47b/0x8e0 fs/f2fs/inline.c:218 f2fs_preallocate_blocks fs/f2fs/file.c:4480 [inline] f2fs_file_write_iter+0x1a1f/0x24d0 fs/f2fs/file.c:4712 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1868 [inline] do_iter_readv_writev+0x20b/0x3b0 fs/read_write.c:735 do_iter_write+0x185/0x7e0 fs/read_write.c:860 vfs_writev+0x1aa/0x670 fs/read_write.c:933 do_pwritev+0x1b6/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1030 __do_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1089 [inline] __se_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1080 [inline] __x64_sys_pwritev2+0xef/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1080 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#17){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3232 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3847 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2fcd/0x5f30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5088 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5705 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5670 down_write+0x92/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1573 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:775 [inline] f2fs_release_file fs/f2fs/file.c:1866 [inline] f2fs_release_file+0xca/0x100 fs/f2fs/file.c:1856 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 fs/file_table.c:321 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179 get_signal+0x1c7/0x25b0 kernel/signal.c:2652 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x79/0x5c0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11f/0x240 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#17 --> &sbi->cp_rwsem --> &sbi->node_write Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(&sbi->node_write); lock(&sbi->cp_rwsem); lock(&sbi->node_write); lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#17); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor110/5218: #0: ffff88802100c448 (&sbi->node_write){++++}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_down_read fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2087 [inline] #0: ffff88802100c448 (&sbi->node_write){++++}-{3:3}, at: f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x166e/0x19d0 fs/f2fs/data.c:2842 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5218 Comm: syz-executor110 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-00037-gb6dad5178cea #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x25f/0x2e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2188 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3113 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3232 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3847 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2fcd/0x5f30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5088 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5705 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5670 down_write+0x92/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1573 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:775 [inline] f2fs_release_file fs/f2fs/file.c:1866 [inline] f2fs_release_file+0xca/0x100 fs/f2fs/file.c:1856 __fput+0x27c/0xa90 fs/file_table.c:321 task_work_run+0x16f/0x270 kernel/task_work.c:179 get_signal+0x1c7/0x25b0 kernel/signal.c:2652 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x79/0x5c0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11f/0x240 kernel/entry/common.c:204 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:286 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:297 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f6b9a0179b9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 a1 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f6b99fc32f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000148 RAX: fffffffffffffffb RBX: 00007f6b9a0a47a8 RCX: 00007f6b9a0179b9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f6b9a0a47a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: 0000000000001400 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6b9a0a47ac R13: 00007f6b9a071008 R14: 6f6f6c2f7665642f R15: 0000000000022000 --- If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with: #syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash If you attach or paste a git patch, syzbot will apply it before testing.