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From: Ram <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
To: Bryan Henderson <hbryan@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>,
	Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Al Viro <viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during	mount	system call
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2005 12:10:54 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1114110654.3856.14.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <OF41FCE7B2.00EA9823-ON88256FEA.000214A0-88256FEA.0003D3FB@us.ibm.com>

On Wed, 2005-04-20 at 17:42, Bryan Henderson wrote:
> >Well I am not aware of issues that can arise if a user is allowed to
> >change to some namespace for which it has permission to switch.
> 
> I think I misunderstood your proposal.
> 
> >A user 'ram' creates a namespace 'n1' with a device node /dev/n1 having
> >permission 700 owned by the user 'ram'. The user than tailors his
> >namespace with a bunch of mount/umount/binds etc to meet his
> >requirement.
> 
> How does that address the setuid problem -- that a setuid program is 
> installed with the expectation that when it runs, certain names will 
> identify certain files (e.g. /etc/shadow)?  But also that certain other 
> names will identify a file of the invoker's choosing?

the new namespace 'n1' though created by the user 'ram', carries the
same restrictions to 'ram' . So 'ram' will not be able to mount
something else on /bin or /sbin or anyother directory that it does not
own, even though its done in its own namespace. Hence I dont see how a
attacker would be able fool a malicious setuid program into a genuine
setuid program. hope this is the concern you were talking about. right?

RP


> 
> >Trying to understand your proposal to see how it could be used to solve
> >the problem faced by the FUSE project.  Are you trying to use a single
> >namespace with invisible mounts capability? 
> 
> Essentially.  It's a compromise.  A user can customize his namespace, but 
> only within limits that preserve the integrity of the system.
> 
> Technically, we have to admit it's not one namespace today or with 
> invisible mounts.  Because of the way mounts cover up mountpoints, it's 
> technically possible for two processes to see different files as the same 
> name, if one opened the directory before a mount and the other after. 
> "Mounting over" is a curse.
> 
> --
> Bryan Henderson                          IBM Almaden Research Center
> San Jose CA                              Filesystems


  reply	other threads:[~2005-04-21 19:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-04-19 22:13 [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call Eric Van Hensbergen
2005-04-19 22:23 ` Al Viro
2005-04-19 23:53   ` Eric Van Hensbergen
2005-04-20  3:33     ` Al Viro
2005-04-20  9:45       ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 10:27         ` Al Viro
2005-04-20 12:03           ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 12:39             ` Al Viro
2005-04-20 16:51               ` Ram
2005-04-20 17:09                 ` Al Viro
2005-04-20 17:53                   ` Miklos Szeredi
     [not found]                     ` <a4e6962a0504201107518416e9@mail.gmail.com>
2005-04-20 18:18                       ` Eric Van Hensbergen
2005-04-20 18:34                         ` Miklos Szeredi
2005-04-20 20:43                           ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 20:54                             ` Al Viro
2005-04-20 22:16                               ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 21:08                     ` Al Viro
2005-04-20 22:19                       ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 18:00                   ` Eric Van Hensbergen
2005-04-20 18:33                   ` Ram
2005-04-20 22:04                     ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-30  8:56                       ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-04-30 15:01                         ` Jamie Lokier
2005-05-11  9:05                           ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-04-21  7:33                   ` Mount bind filehandle (Was: Re: [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call) Jan Hudec
2005-04-21  8:09                     ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-04-21  9:32                       ` Jan Hudec
2005-04-20 18:57                 ` [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call Bryan Henderson
2005-04-20 19:37                   ` Miklos Szeredi
2005-04-21  0:08                     ` Bryan Henderson
2005-04-21  8:06                       ` Miklos Szeredi
2005-04-21 13:33                         ` [RFC][patch] mount permissions (was: [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow ...) Miklos Szeredi
2005-04-21 16:57                         ` [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call Bryan Henderson
2005-04-20 20:51                   ` Al Viro
2005-04-21  0:23                     ` Bryan Henderson
2005-04-21  0:32                       ` Al Viro
2005-04-21  8:10                       ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-04-20 21:09                   ` Ram
2005-04-21  0:42                     ` Bryan Henderson
2005-04-21 19:10                       ` Ram [this message]
2005-04-20 18:25               ` Bryan Henderson
2005-04-20 12:48         ` Jan Hudec
2005-04-20 22:13           ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-21 10:09             ` Jan Hudec
2005-04-21 18:44               ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-21 18:52                 ` Hiding secrets from root (Was: Re: [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call) Jan Hudec
2005-04-21 20:35                   ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 13:14       ` [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call Eric Van Hensbergen
2005-04-20 13:55         ` Eric Van Hensbergen

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