From: Ram <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
To: Bryan Henderson <hbryan@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>,
Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Al Viro <viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call
Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2005 12:10:54 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1114110654.3856.14.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <OF41FCE7B2.00EA9823-ON88256FEA.000214A0-88256FEA.0003D3FB@us.ibm.com>
On Wed, 2005-04-20 at 17:42, Bryan Henderson wrote:
> >Well I am not aware of issues that can arise if a user is allowed to
> >change to some namespace for which it has permission to switch.
>
> I think I misunderstood your proposal.
>
> >A user 'ram' creates a namespace 'n1' with a device node /dev/n1 having
> >permission 700 owned by the user 'ram'. The user than tailors his
> >namespace with a bunch of mount/umount/binds etc to meet his
> >requirement.
>
> How does that address the setuid problem -- that a setuid program is
> installed with the expectation that when it runs, certain names will
> identify certain files (e.g. /etc/shadow)? But also that certain other
> names will identify a file of the invoker's choosing?
the new namespace 'n1' though created by the user 'ram', carries the
same restrictions to 'ram' . So 'ram' will not be able to mount
something else on /bin or /sbin or anyother directory that it does not
own, even though its done in its own namespace. Hence I dont see how a
attacker would be able fool a malicious setuid program into a genuine
setuid program. hope this is the concern you were talking about. right?
RP
>
> >Trying to understand your proposal to see how it could be used to solve
> >the problem faced by the FUSE project. Are you trying to use a single
> >namespace with invisible mounts capability?
>
> Essentially. It's a compromise. A user can customize his namespace, but
> only within limits that preserve the integrity of the system.
>
> Technically, we have to admit it's not one namespace today or with
> invisible mounts. Because of the way mounts cover up mountpoints, it's
> technically possible for two processes to see different files as the same
> name, if one opened the directory before a mount and the other after.
> "Mounting over" is a curse.
>
> --
> Bryan Henderson IBM Almaden Research Center
> San Jose CA Filesystems
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-04-21 19:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-04-19 22:13 [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call Eric Van Hensbergen
2005-04-19 22:23 ` Al Viro
2005-04-19 23:53 ` Eric Van Hensbergen
2005-04-20 3:33 ` Al Viro
2005-04-20 9:45 ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 10:27 ` Al Viro
2005-04-20 12:03 ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 12:39 ` Al Viro
2005-04-20 16:51 ` Ram
2005-04-20 17:09 ` Al Viro
2005-04-20 17:53 ` Miklos Szeredi
[not found] ` <a4e6962a0504201107518416e9@mail.gmail.com>
2005-04-20 18:18 ` Eric Van Hensbergen
2005-04-20 18:34 ` Miklos Szeredi
2005-04-20 20:43 ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 20:54 ` Al Viro
2005-04-20 22:16 ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 21:08 ` Al Viro
2005-04-20 22:19 ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 18:00 ` Eric Van Hensbergen
2005-04-20 18:33 ` Ram
2005-04-20 22:04 ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-30 8:56 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-04-30 15:01 ` Jamie Lokier
2005-05-11 9:05 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-04-21 7:33 ` Mount bind filehandle (Was: Re: [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call) Jan Hudec
2005-04-21 8:09 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-04-21 9:32 ` Jan Hudec
2005-04-20 18:57 ` [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call Bryan Henderson
2005-04-20 19:37 ` Miklos Szeredi
2005-04-21 0:08 ` Bryan Henderson
2005-04-21 8:06 ` Miklos Szeredi
2005-04-21 13:33 ` [RFC][patch] mount permissions (was: [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow ...) Miklos Szeredi
2005-04-21 16:57 ` [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call Bryan Henderson
2005-04-20 20:51 ` Al Viro
2005-04-21 0:23 ` Bryan Henderson
2005-04-21 0:32 ` Al Viro
2005-04-21 8:10 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-04-20 21:09 ` Ram
2005-04-21 0:42 ` Bryan Henderson
2005-04-21 19:10 ` Ram [this message]
2005-04-20 18:25 ` Bryan Henderson
2005-04-20 12:48 ` Jan Hudec
2005-04-20 22:13 ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-21 10:09 ` Jan Hudec
2005-04-21 18:44 ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-21 18:52 ` Hiding secrets from root (Was: Re: [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call) Jan Hudec
2005-04-21 20:35 ` Jamie Lokier
2005-04-20 13:14 ` [RFC][2.6 patch] Allow creation of new namespaces during mount system call Eric Van Hensbergen
2005-04-20 13:55 ` Eric Van Hensbergen
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