From: Karl MacMillan <kmacmill@redhat.com>
To: Crispin Cowan <crispin@novell.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: AppArmor FAQ
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2007 19:13:26 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1176851606.5946.120.camel@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4625505C.6010802@novell.com>
On Tue, 2007-04-17 at 15:55 -0700, Crispin Cowan wrote:
> Karl MacMillan wrote:
> > On Mon, 2007-04-16 at 20:20 -0400, James Morris wrote:
> >
> >> On Mon, 16 Apr 2007, John Johansen wrote:
> >>
> >>> Label-based security (exemplified by SELinux, and its predecessors in
> >>> MLS systems) attaches security policy to the data. As the data flows
> >>> through the system, the label sticks to the data, and so security
> >>> policy with respect to this data stays intact. This is a good approach
> >>> for ensuring secrecy, the kind of problem that intelligence agencies have.
> >>>
> >> Labels are also a good approach for ensuring integrity, which is one of
> >> the most fundamental aspects of the security model implemented by SELinux.
> >>
> >> Some may infer otherwise from your document.
> >>
> > Not only that, the implication that secrecy is only useful to
> > intelligence agencies is pretty funny.
> That was not the claim.
It might not have been the claim, but I certainly think it was the
implication.
> Rather, that intelligence agencies have a very
> strong need for privacy, and will go to greater lengths to get it,
> including using MLS systems. I contend that while most organizations
> want privacy, they don't want it so badly that they will put up with
> MLS, and so are looking for a more tolerable form of security.
>
Definitely - which is why SELinux is primarily about type enforcement.
> This is relevant here because information flow is the main advantage of
> labels over pathnames for access control.
I would say that controlling information flow is _one_ of the main
advantages of labels. There are others.
> AppArmor does not attempt to
> manage information flow, allowing it to use pathnames to achieve ease of
> use. If you want information flow control, then by all means use a
> label-based system.
>
You're trying to force a false choice between "ease of use" and
"information flow control". These AppArmor / SELinux debates are
irritating enough without these kinds of misleading rhetorical
techniques.
Karl
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-04-17 23:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-04-16 21:33 AppArmor FAQ John Johansen
2007-04-17 0:20 ` James Morris
2007-04-17 15:03 ` David Safford
2007-04-17 16:00 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 18:05 ` Andi Kleen
2007-04-17 17:47 ` James Morris
2007-04-17 18:10 ` Andi Kleen
2007-04-17 20:19 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-04-17 20:50 ` James Morris
2007-04-17 21:16 ` Andi Kleen
2007-04-17 21:41 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 22:12 ` Andi Kleen
2007-04-17 22:29 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 21:58 ` Alan Cox
2007-04-18 13:45 ` James Morris
2007-04-18 14:33 ` Shaya Potter
2007-04-18 19:41 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-04-18 20:03 ` Shaya Potter
2007-04-18 21:14 ` James Morris
2007-04-19 17:14 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-06-09 21:01 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-09 21:28 ` david
2007-06-09 23:02 ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-10 0:06 ` david
2007-04-18 20:15 ` David Lang
2007-04-19 17:27 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-04-17 21:48 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 23:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-04-17 22:26 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-19 17:46 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-04-20 18:45 ` David Lang
2007-04-20 19:23 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 23:09 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-04-17 23:20 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-19 17:56 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-04-17 21:55 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 22:55 ` Crispin Cowan
2007-04-17 23:13 ` Karl MacMillan [this message]
2007-06-09 14:11 ` Pavel Machek
2007-04-18 7:21 ` Rob Meijer
2007-04-18 7:08 ` David Lang
2007-04-18 13:33 ` James Morris
2007-04-18 12:15 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-04-18 13:31 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-04-18 14:05 ` Rob Meijer
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