From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: David Howells Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2008 20:11:21 +0000 Message-ID: <12508.1203538281@redhat.com> References: <20080220195811.GD16668@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> <20080220160557.4715.66608.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com, nfsv4@linux-nfs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, casey@schaufler-ca.com To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20080220195811.GD16668@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: nfsv4-bounces@linux-nfs.org Errors-To: nfsv4-bounces@linux-nfs.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Seems *really* weird that every time you send this, patch 6 doesn't seem > to reach me in any of my mailboxes... (did get it from the url > you listed) It's the largest of the patches, so that's not entirely surprising. Hence why I included the URL to the tarball also. > I'm sorry if I miss where you explicitly state this, but is it safe to > assume, as perusing the patches suggests, that > > 1. tsk->sec never changes other than in task_alloc_security()? Correct. > 2. tsk->act_as is only ever dereferenced from (a) current-> That ought to be correct. > except (b) in do_coredump? Actually, do_coredump() only deals with current->act_as. > (thereby carefully avoiding locking issues) That's the idea. > I'd still like to see some performance numbers. Not to object to > these patches, just to make sure there's no need to try and optimize > more of the dereferences away when they're not needed. I hope that the performance impact is minimal. The kernel should spend very little time looking at the security data. I'll try and get some though. > Oh, manually copied from patch 6, I see you have in the task_security > struct definition: > > kernel_cap_t cap_bset; /* ? */ > > That comment can be filled in with 'capability bounding set' (for this > task and all its future descendents). Thanks. David