From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com, pavel@ucw.cz, miklos@szeredi.hu,
viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] vfs: check path permissions on target of LAST_BIND symlinks
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2009 12:41:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1258998084-26797-4-git-send-email-jlayton@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1258998084-26797-1-git-send-email-jlayton@redhat.com>
Because LAST_BIND symlinks aren't subject to the normal path walking
routines, they sidestep all of the permission checking that occurs while
resolving a path. Fix this by adding a routine to walk back up the
directory tree and check MAY_EXEC permission on the entire path back up to
the root.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 738b257..d4c1279 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -504,6 +504,57 @@ ok:
}
/*
+ * We have a cached struct path from a LAST_BIND symlink. The path is valid
+ * but it's possible that one of the components leading to this point
+ * might not be accessible. This check walks back up the tree to the root
+ * of the namespace and checks whether each component is accessible. The
+ * supplied path is put on error.
+ */
+static int
+check_path_accessible(struct path *path)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct dentry *parent, *tdentry = dget(path->dentry);
+ struct vfsmount *vfsmnt = mntget(path->mnt);
+ struct path root = current->fs->root;
+
+ path_get(&root);
+ for(;;) {
+ parent = dget_parent(tdentry);
+ err = inode_permission(parent->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ dput(parent);
+ break;
+ }
+ dput(tdentry);
+ tdentry = parent;
+
+ /* keep going if not to root of mnt */
+ if (!IS_ROOT(tdentry))
+ continue;
+
+ /* are we at global root or root of namespace? */
+ if ((tdentry == root.dentry && vfsmnt == root.mnt) ||
+ vfsmnt->mnt_parent == vfsmnt)
+ break;
+
+ /* cross to parent mount and keep walking */
+ mntput(vfsmnt);
+ vfsmnt = mntget(vfsmnt->mnt_parent);
+ tdentry = dget(vfsmnt->mnt_mountpoint);
+ dput(parent);
+ }
+ dput(tdentry);
+ mntput(vfsmnt);
+ path_put(&root);
+
+ if (err)
+ path_put(path);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
* This is called when everything else fails, and we actually have
* to go to the low-level filesystem to find out what we should do..
*
@@ -679,8 +730,12 @@ static __always_inline int __do_follow_link(struct path *path, struct nameidata
error = 0;
if (s)
error = __vfs_follow_link(nd, s);
- else if (nd->last_type == LAST_BIND)
+ else if (nd->last_type == LAST_BIND) {
error = force_reval_path(&nd->path, nd);
+ if (!error)
+ error = check_path_accessible(&nd->path);
+ }
+
if (dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link)
dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link(dentry, nd, cookie);
}
--
1.5.5.6
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-11-23 17:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-11-23 17:41 [PATCH 0/3] vfs: plug some holes involving LAST_BIND symlinks and file bind mounts (try #5) Jeff Layton
2009-11-23 17:41 ` [PATCH 1/3] vfs: force reval of target when following LAST_BIND symlinks Jeff Layton
2009-11-23 17:41 ` [PATCH 2/3] vfs: force reval on dentry of bind mounted files on FS_REVAL_DOT filesystems Jeff Layton
2009-11-23 17:41 ` Jeff Layton [this message]
2009-11-23 22:05 ` [PATCH 0/3] vfs: plug some holes involving LAST_BIND symlinks and file bind mounts (try #5) Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-23 22:36 ` Jeff Layton
2009-11-23 22:49 ` Jamie Lokier
2009-11-23 23:15 ` Jeff Layton
2009-11-23 23:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-24 0:34 ` Jeff Layton
2009-11-24 1:20 ` Jamie Lokier
2009-11-24 11:26 ` Jeff Layton
2009-11-24 11:53 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-24 12:09 ` Pavel Machek
2009-11-24 12:59 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-11-30 12:28 ` Pavel Machek
2009-11-30 19:21 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-24 13:13 ` Duane Griffin
2009-11-30 19:00 ` Jamie Lokier
2009-12-01 8:56 ` Duane Griffin
2009-12-16 12:31 ` Al Viro
2009-12-20 19:59 ` Pavel Machek
2009-12-20 21:04 ` Al Viro
2009-12-20 21:06 ` Pavel Machek
2009-12-20 21:23 ` Al Viro
2010-01-01 15:40 ` Pavel Machek
2010-01-10 4:42 ` Al Viro
2009-12-01 13:15 ` Jeff Layton
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1258998084-26797-4-git-send-email-jlayton@redhat.com \
--to=jlayton@redhat.com \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=miklos@szeredi.hu \
--cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
--cc=viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).