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From: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: hch@infradead.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/3] vfs: Add open by file handle support
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2010 11:12:28 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1266558149-11460-3-git-send-email-aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1266558149-11460-1-git-send-email-aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 fs/namei.c            |   24 -------
 fs/open.c             |  166 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/namei.h |   24 +++++++
 3 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index d62fdc8..7ffdfe9 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1558,30 +1558,6 @@ out_unlock:
 	return may_open(&nd->path, 0, flag & ~O_TRUNC);
 }
 
-/*
- * Note that while the flag value (low two bits) for sys_open means:
- *	00 - read-only
- *	01 - write-only
- *	10 - read-write
- *	11 - special
- * it is changed into
- *	00 - no permissions needed
- *	01 - read-permission
- *	10 - write-permission
- *	11 - read-write
- * for the internal routines (ie open_namei()/follow_link() etc)
- * This is more logical, and also allows the 00 "no perm needed"
- * to be used for symlinks (where the permissions are checked
- * later).
- *
-*/
-static inline int open_to_namei_flags(int flag)
-{
-	if ((flag+1) & O_ACCMODE)
-		flag++;
-	return flag;
-}
-
 static int open_will_truncate(int flag, struct inode *inode)
 {
 	/*
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index f5a8420..4187651 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -1273,3 +1273,169 @@ int nonseekable_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 }
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(nonseekable_open);
+
+static int vfs_dentry_acceptable(void *context, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static struct path *path_from_fd(int fd)
+{
+	struct path *path;
+	struct file *filep;
+
+	if (fd == AT_FDCWD) {
+		struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
+		read_lock(&fs->lock);
+		path = &fs->pwd;
+		path_get(path);
+		read_unlock(&fs->lock);
+	} else {
+		filep = fget(fd);
+		if (!filep)
+			return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
+		path = &filep->f_path;
+		path_get(path);
+		fput(filep);
+	}
+	return path;
+}
+
+
+static struct dentry *handle_to_dentry(struct path *path,
+				struct file_handle *fh)
+{
+	int retval = 0;
+	void *handle = NULL;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	int handle_size = fh->handle_size;
+
+	inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
+		!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) &&
+		!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
+		retval =  -EINVAL;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	/* should we do some check on handle size ?*/
+	handle = kmalloc(handle_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!handle) {
+		retval =  -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	if (copy_from_user(handle, fh->f_handle,
+				handle_size*sizeof(u32))) {
+		retval = -EFAULT;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	dentry = exportfs_decode_fh(path->mnt, (struct fid *)handle,
+					handle_size, fh->handle_type,
+					vfs_dentry_acceptable, NULL);
+	kfree(handle);
+	return dentry;
+
+err_out:
+	kfree(handle);
+	return ERR_PTR(retval);
+}
+
+long do_sys_open_by_handle(int dfd, struct file_handle *fh, int flags)
+{
+	int fd;
+	int retval = 0;
+	int d_flags  = flags;
+	struct path *path;
+	struct file *filp;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		/* Allow open by handle only by sysadmin */
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	path = path_from_fd(dfd);
+	if (IS_ERR(path))
+		return PTR_ERR(path);
+
+	dentry = handle_to_dentry(path, fh);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		path_put(path);
+		return PTR_ERR(dentry);
+	}
+
+	inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	/* Restrict open_by_handle to directories & regular files. */
+	if (!(S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))) {
+		retval = -EINVAL;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	flags  = open_to_namei_flags(flags);
+	/* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
+	if (flags & O_TRUNC)
+		flags |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+	if ((!(flags & O_APPEND) || (flags & O_TRUNC)) &&
+		(flags & FMODE_WRITE) && IS_APPEND(inode)) {
+		retval = -EPERM;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	if ((flags & FMODE_WRITE) && IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) {
+		retval = -EACCES;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	/* Can't write directories. */
+	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && (flags & FMODE_WRITE)) {
+		retval = -EISDIR;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	fd = get_unused_fd();
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		retval = fd;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
+	filp = dentry_open(dentry, mntget(path->mnt),
+			d_flags, current_cred());
+	if (IS_ERR(filp)) {
+		put_unused_fd(fd);
+		return PTR_ERR(filp);
+	}
+
+	if (inode->i_mode & S_IFREG) {
+		filp->f_flags |= O_NOATIME;
+		filp->f_mode |= FMODE_NOCMTIME;
+	}
+	fsnotify_open(filp->f_path.dentry);
+	fd_install(fd, filp);
+	path_put(path);
+	return fd;
+
+err_out:
+	path_put(path);
+	dput(dentry);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE2(open_by_handle, struct file_handle __user *, handle, int, flags)
+{
+	long ret;
+	struct file_handle f_handle;
+
+	if (force_o_largefile())
+		flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&f_handle, handle, sizeof(struct file_handle))) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+	ret = do_sys_open_by_handle(AT_FDCWD, &f_handle, flags);
+err_out:
+	/* avoid REGPARM breakage on x86: */
+	asmlinkage_protect(2, ret, handle, flags);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h
index 05b441d..a853aa0 100644
--- a/include/linux/namei.h
+++ b/include/linux/namei.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/path.h>
+#include <asm-generic/fcntl.h>
 
 struct vfsmount;
 
@@ -96,4 +97,27 @@ static inline void nd_terminate_link(void *name, size_t len, size_t maxlen)
 	((char *) name)[min(len, maxlen)] = '\0';
 }
 
+/*
+ * Note that while the flag value (low two bits) for sys_open means:
+ *	00 - read-only
+ *	01 - write-only
+ *	10 - read-write
+ *	11 - special
+ * it is changed into
+ *	00 - no permissions needed
+ *	01 - read-permission
+ *	10 - write-permission
+ *	11 - read-write
+ * for the internal routines (ie open_namei()/follow_link() etc)
+ * This is more logical, and also allows the 00 "no perm needed"
+ * to be used for symlinks (where the permissions are checked
+ * later).
+ *
+*/
+static inline int open_to_namei_flags(int flag)
+{
+	if ((flag+1) & O_ACCMODE)
+		flag++;
+	return flag;
+}
 #endif /* _LINUX_NAMEI_H */
-- 
1.7.0.31.g1df487


  parent reply	other threads:[~2010-02-19  5:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-02-19  5:42 [RFC PATCH] Generic name to handle and open by handle syscalls Aneesh Kumar K.V
2010-02-19  5:42 ` [RFC PATCH 1/3] vfs: Add name to file handle conversion support Aneesh Kumar K.V
2010-02-20 18:15   ` Andreas Dilger
2010-02-22  5:15     ` Aneesh Kumar K. V
2010-02-19  5:42 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2010-02-20 18:58   ` [RFC PATCH 2/3] vfs: Add open by file handle support Andreas Dilger
2010-02-20 20:13     ` Brad Boyer
     [not found]       ` <FB88A140-C2EB-4E62-9769-D2524C874C8C@sun.com>
2010-02-22  2:46         ` Brad Boyer
2010-02-26 19:21         ` J. Bruce Fields
2010-02-28 17:55           ` Andreas Dilger
2010-02-28 19:00             ` J. Bruce Fields
2010-03-01 18:25               ` Oleg Drokin
2010-03-01 21:25                 ` J. Bruce Fields
2010-02-22  6:13     ` Aneesh Kumar K. V
2010-02-22  6:31       ` Dave Chinner
2010-02-26 19:24     ` J. Bruce Fields
2010-02-19  5:42 ` [RFC PATCH 3/3] x86: Add new syscalls for x86_32 Aneesh Kumar K.V
2010-02-19  9:34 ` [RFC PATCH] Generic name to handle and open by handle syscalls Andreas Dilger
2010-02-19  9:49   ` Aneesh Kumar K. V
2010-02-20 19:01     ` Andreas Dilger
2010-02-22  6:27       ` Aneesh Kumar K. V
2010-02-22 23:06 ` Jonathan Corbet
2010-02-23  0:56   ` James Morris
2010-02-23  8:58   ` Aneesh Kumar K. V
2010-02-23 19:46     ` Jonathan Corbet
2010-02-24  0:49     ` Dave Chinner
2010-02-25  4:53     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-02-25 14:30       ` Jonathan Corbet
2010-02-25 15:19         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-02-25 17:55           ` Aneesh Kumar K. V
2010-02-25 18:11             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-02-25 18:20               ` Aneesh Kumar K. V
2010-02-25 19:05                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-02-26  9:12                   ` Andreas Dilger
2010-02-26 19:56                     ` Serge E. Hallyn

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