From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.s.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 09/20] fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2011 08:23:32 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1307017423-15093-10-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1307017423-15093-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
After creating the initial LSM security extended attribute, call
evm_inode_post_init_security() to create the 'security.evm'
extended attribute.
(Support for other fs are defined as separate patches.)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
---
fs/ext2/xattr_security.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
fs/ext3/xattr_security.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
fs/ext4/xattr_security.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
3 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c b/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c
index 5d979b4..e17820c 100644
--- a/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c
+++ b/fs/ext2/xattr_security.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "xattr.h"
static size_t
@@ -51,21 +52,37 @@ ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr)
{
int err;
- size_t len;
- void *value;
- char *name;
+ struct xattr lsm_xattr;
+ struct xattr evm_xattr;
- err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &name, &value, &len);
+ err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &lsm_xattr.name,
+ &lsm_xattr.value,
+ &lsm_xattr.value_len);
if (err) {
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return 0;
return err;
}
err = ext2_xattr_set(inode, EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
- name, value, len, 0);
- kfree(name);
- kfree(value);
+ lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value,
+ lsm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = evm_inode_post_init_security(inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = ext2_xattr_set(inode, EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
+ evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value,
+ evm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ kfree(evm_xattr.value);
+out:
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.name);
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.value);
+ if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return 0;
return err;
+
}
const struct xattr_handler ext2_xattr_security_handler = {
diff --git a/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c b/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c
index b8d9f83..844786b 100644
--- a/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c
+++ b/fs/ext3/xattr_security.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/ext3_jbd.h>
#include <linux/ext3_fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "xattr.h"
static size_t
@@ -53,20 +54,35 @@ ext3_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr)
{
int err;
- size_t len;
- void *value;
- char *name;
+ struct xattr lsm_xattr;
+ struct xattr evm_xattr;
- err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &name, &value, &len);
+ err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &lsm_xattr.name,
+ &lsm_xattr.value,
+ &lsm_xattr.value_len);
if (err) {
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return 0;
return err;
}
err = ext3_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT3_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
- name, value, len, 0);
- kfree(name);
- kfree(value);
+ lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value,
+ lsm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = evm_inode_post_init_security(inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = ext3_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT3_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
+ evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value,
+ evm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ kfree(evm_xattr.value);
+out:
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.name);
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.value);
+ if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return 0;
return err;
}
diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c b/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c
index 007c3bf..c5fdb96 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/xattr_security.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
#include "ext4_jbd2.h"
#include "ext4.h"
#include "xattr.h"
@@ -53,20 +54,35 @@ ext4_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr)
{
int err;
- size_t len;
- void *value;
- char *name;
+ struct xattr lsm_xattr;
+ struct xattr evm_xattr;
- err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &name, &value, &len);
+ err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, &lsm_xattr.name,
+ &lsm_xattr.value,
+ &lsm_xattr.value_len);
if (err) {
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return 0;
return err;
}
err = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
- name, value, len, 0);
- kfree(name);
- kfree(value);
+ lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value,
+ lsm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = evm_inode_post_init_security(inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
+ evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value,
+ evm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+ kfree(evm_xattr.value);
+out:
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.name);
+ kfree(lsm_xattr.value);
+ if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return 0;
return err;
}
--
1.7.3.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-06-02 12:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-06-02 12:23 [PATCH v6 00/20] EVM Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 01/20] integrity: move ima inode integrity data management Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 02/20] xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 03/20] evm: re-release Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 22:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 04/20] evm: add support for different security.evm data types Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 22:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-06-03 12:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 05/20] security: imbed evm calls in security hooks Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 06/20] evm: evm_inode_post_removexattr Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 07/20] evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 08/20] evm: evm_inode_post_init Mimi Zohar
2011-06-03 2:21 ` Dave Chinner
2011-06-03 5:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2011-06-04 23:50 ` Dave Chinner
2011-06-05 2:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2011-06-07 15:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2011-06-02 12:23 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 10/20] evm: crypto hash replaced by shash Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 11/20] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in btrfs Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 12/20] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in gfs2 Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 13/20] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in jffs2 Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 14/20] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in jfs Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 15/20] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in xfs Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 16/20] evm: additional parameter to pass integrity cache entry 'iint' Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 17/20] evm: evm_verify_hmac must not return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 18/20] evm: replace hmac_status with evm_status Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 19/20] evm: permit only valid security.evm xattrs to be updated Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 20/20] evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent updating an invalid security.evm Mimi Zohar
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