From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF
Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2012 19:21:09 +0800
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Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com,
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To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
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On Fri, 2012-01-27 at 17:24 -0600, Will Drewry wrote:
> +config SECCOMP_FILTER
> +       bool "Enable seccomp-based system call filtering"
> +       select SECCOMP

Is 'depends on SECCOMP' better?

> +       help
> +         This option provide support for limiting the accessibility
> of

s/provide/provides/

> +         systems calls at a task-level using a dynamically defined
> policy.


s/systems/system/

> +
> +         System call filtering policy is expressed by the user using
> +         a Berkeley Packet Filter program.  The program is attached
> using

s/the user using//

> +         prctl(2).  For every system call the task makes, its number,
> +         arguments, and other metadata will be evaluated by the
> attached
> +         filter program.  The result determines if the system call
> may
> +         may proceed or if the task should be terminated.

One more "may"... and "be proceeded"

> +
> +         This behavior is meant to aid security-conscious software in
> +         its ability to minimize the risk of running potentially
> +         risky code.
> +
> +         See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for more detail.
> + 


Thanks.