From: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx>, Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>,
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>,
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>, Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>,
dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Karol Lewandowski <k.lewandowsk@samsung.com>,
Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
"Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] fs: fix i_writecount on shmem and friends
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2014 20:06:46 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1395256011-2423-2-git-send-email-dh.herrmann@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1395256011-2423-1-git-send-email-dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
VM_DENYWRITE currently relies on i_writecount. Unless there's an active
writable reference to an inode, VM_DENYWRITE is not allowed.
Unfortunately, alloc_file() does not increase i_writecount, therefore,
does not prevent a following VM_DENYWRITE even though the new file might
have been opened with FMODE_WRITE. However, callers of alloc_file() expect
the file object to be fully instantiated so they can call fput() on it. We
could now either fix all callers to do an get_write_access() if opened
with FMODE_WRITE, or simply fix alloc_file() to do that. I chose the
latter.
Note that this bug allows some rather subtle misbehavior. The following
sequence of calls should work just fine, but currently fails:
int p[2], orig, ro, rw;
char buf[128];
pipe(p);
sprintf(buf, "/proc/self/fd/%d", p[1]);
ro = open(buf, O_RDONLY);
close(p[1]);
sprintf(buf, "/proc/self/fd/%d", ro);
rw = open(buf, O_RDWR);
The final open() cannot succeed as close(p[1]) caused an integer underflow
on i_writecount, effectively causing VM_DENYWRITE on the inode. The open
will fail with -ETXTBUSY.
It's a rather odd sequence of calls and given that open() doesn't use
alloc_file() (and thus not affected by this bug), it's rather unlikely
that this is a serious issue. But stuff like anon_inode shares a *single*
inode across a huge set of interfaces. If any of these is broken like
pipe(), it will affect all of these (ranging from dma-buf to epoll).
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
---
Hi
This patch is only included for reference. It was submitted to fs-devel
separately and is being worked on. However, this bug must be fixed in order to
make use of memfd_create(), so I decided to include it here.
David
fs/file_table.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 5b24008..8059d68 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ struct file *alloc_file(struct path *path, fmode_t mode,
const struct file_operations *fop)
{
struct file *file;
+ int error;
file = get_empty_filp();
if (IS_ERR(file))
@@ -179,15 +180,23 @@ struct file *alloc_file(struct path *path, fmode_t mode,
file->f_mode = mode;
file->f_op = fop;
- /*
- * These mounts don't really matter in practice
- * for r/o bind mounts. They aren't userspace-
- * visible. We do this for consistency, and so
- * that we can do debugging checks at __fput()
- */
- if ((mode & FMODE_WRITE) && !special_file(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
- file_take_write(file);
- WARN_ON(mnt_clone_write(path->mnt));
+ if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+ error = get_write_access(path->dentry->d_inode);
+ if (error) {
+ put_filp(file);
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * These mounts don't really matter in practice
+ * for r/o bind mounts. They aren't userspace-
+ * visible. We do this for consistency, and so
+ * that we can do debugging checks at __fput()
+ */
+ if (!special_file(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
+ file_take_write(file);
+ WARN_ON(mnt_clone_write(path->mnt));
+ }
}
if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_inc(path->dentry->d_inode);
--
1.9.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-03-19 19:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-03-19 19:06 [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` David Herrmann [this message]
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 2/6] shm: add sealing API David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 3/6] shm: add memfd_create() syscall David Herrmann
2014-03-20 8:47 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2014-03-20 9:01 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 11:29 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:50 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2014-03-20 19:22 ` John Stultz
2014-04-02 13:38 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-02 14:18 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-02 14:52 ` Konstantin Khlebnikov
2014-04-10 19:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH 4/6] selftests: add memfd_create() + sealing tests David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH man-pages 5/6] fcntl.2: document SHMEM_SET/GET_SEALS commands David Herrmann
2014-03-19 19:06 ` [PATCH man-pages 6/6] memfd_create.2: add memfd_create() man-page David Herrmann
2014-03-20 2:55 ` [PATCH 0/6] File Sealing & memfd_create() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2014-03-20 3:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-03-20 8:07 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 14:41 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:12 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 15:26 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:32 ` tytso
2014-03-20 15:39 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2014-03-20 15:48 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 16:38 ` tytso
2014-04-10 19:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:32 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-04-10 20:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 20:49 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 21:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 22:57 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 23:16 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 23:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-20 15:03 ` Pavel Machek
2014-06-17 9:48 ` Florian Weimer
2014-06-17 16:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 14:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-10 19:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-04-10 19:45 ` Colin Walters
2014-04-11 6:09 ` Alex Elsayed
2014-04-08 13:00 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-09 21:31 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 9:10 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 11:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-22 12:44 ` Florian Weimer
2014-04-22 12:55 ` David Herrmann
2014-04-10 19:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
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