From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Seth Forshee Subject: [PATCH v2 7/7] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 16:05:18 -0500 Message-ID: <1439240719-46850-8-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> References: <1439240719-46850-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn , Andy Lutomirski , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, Seth Forshee , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" To: "Eric W. Biederman" , Alexander Viro , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , Eric Paris Return-path: Received: from mail-ig0-f170.google.com ([209.85.213.170]:35727 "EHLO mail-ig0-f170.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933263AbbHJVFr (ORCPT ); Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:05:47 -0400 Received: by igbjg10 with SMTP id jg10so9437723igb.0 for ; Mon, 10 Aug 2015 14:05:46 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <1439240719-46850-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Security labels from unprivileged mounts in user namespaces must be ignored. Force superblocks from user namespaces whose labeling behavior is to use xattrs to use mountpoint labeling instead. For the mountpoint label, default to converting the current task context into a form suitable for file objects, but also allow the policy writer to specify a different label through policy transition rules. Pieced together from code snippets provided by Stephen Smalley. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 459e71ddbc9d..242dac0b8b24 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -745,6 +745,28 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, goto out; } } + + /* + * If this is a user namespace mount, no contexts are allowed + * on the command line and security labels must be ignored. + */ + if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns) { + if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid || + defcontext_sid) { + rc = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { + sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; + rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(), current_sid(), + SECCLASS_FILE, NULL, + &sbsec->mntpoint_sid); + if (rc) + goto out; + } + goto out_set_opts; + } + /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ if (fscontext_sid) { rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred); @@ -813,6 +835,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid; } +out_set_opts: rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb); out: mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); -- 1.9.1