From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 10/19] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts
Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2015 09:40:10 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1449070821-73820-11-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1449070821-73820-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>
ids in on-disk ACLs should be converted to s_user_ns instead of
init_user_ns as is done now. This introduces the possibility for
id mappings to fail, and when this happens syscalls will return
EOVERFLOW.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
---
fs/posix_acl.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
fs/xattr.c | 19 +++++++++---
include/linux/posix_acl_xattr.h | 17 ++++++++---
3 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index 4adde1e2cbec..a29442eb4af8 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -595,59 +595,77 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(posix_acl_create);
/*
* Fix up the uids and gids in posix acl extended attributes in place.
*/
-static void posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(
+static int posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(
struct user_namespace *to, struct user_namespace *from,
void *value, size_t size)
{
posix_acl_xattr_header *header = (posix_acl_xattr_header *)value;
posix_acl_xattr_entry *entry = (posix_acl_xattr_entry *)(header+1), *end;
int count;
- kuid_t uid;
- kgid_t gid;
+ kuid_t kuid;
+ uid_t uid;
+ kgid_t kgid;
+ gid_t gid;
if (!value)
- return;
+ return 0;
if (size < sizeof(posix_acl_xattr_header))
- return;
+ return 0;
if (header->a_version != cpu_to_le32(POSIX_ACL_XATTR_VERSION))
- return;
+ return 0;
count = posix_acl_xattr_count(size);
if (count < 0)
- return;
+ return 0;
if (count == 0)
- return;
+ return 0;
for (end = entry + count; entry != end; entry++) {
switch(le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag)) {
case ACL_USER:
- uid = make_kuid(from, le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
- entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(to, uid));
+ kuid = make_kuid(from, le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
+ if (!uid_valid(kuid))
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ uid = from_kuid(to, kuid);
+ if (uid == (uid_t)-1)
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(uid);
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
- gid = make_kgid(from, le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
- entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(to, gid));
+ kgid = make_kgid(from, le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
+ if (!gid_valid(kgid))
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ gid = from_kgid(to, kgid);
+ if (gid == (gid_t)-1)
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ entry->e_id = cpu_to_le32(gid);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
+
+ return 0;
}
-void posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(void *value, size_t size)
+int
+posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(struct user_namespace *target_ns, void *value,
+ size_t size)
{
- struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
- if (user_ns == &init_user_ns)
- return;
- posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(&init_user_ns, user_ns, value, size);
+ struct user_namespace *source_ns = current_user_ns();
+ if (source_ns == target_ns)
+ return 0;
+ return posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(target_ns, source_ns, value, size);
}
-void posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(void *value, size_t size)
+int
+posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(struct user_namespace *source_ns, void *value,
+ size_t size)
{
- struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
- if (user_ns == &init_user_ns)
- return;
- posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(user_ns, &init_user_ns, value, size);
+ struct user_namespace *target_ns = current_user_ns();
+ if (target_ns == source_ns)
+ return 0;
+ return posix_acl_fix_xattr_userns(target_ns, source_ns, value, size);
}
/*
@@ -782,7 +800,7 @@ posix_acl_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
if (acl == NULL)
return -ENODATA;
- error = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, value, size);
+ error = posix_acl_to_xattr(dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns, acl, value, size);
posix_acl_release(acl);
return error;
@@ -810,7 +828,8 @@ posix_acl_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
return -EPERM;
if (value) {
- acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, size);
+ acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns, value,
+ size);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return PTR_ERR(acl);
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 9b932b95d74e..1268d8d5f74b 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -351,8 +351,12 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name, const void __user *value,
goto out;
}
if ((strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == 0) ||
- (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0))
- posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(kvalue, size);
+ (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0)) {
+ error = posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(d->d_sb->s_user_ns,
+ kvalue, size);
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
+ }
}
error = vfs_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
@@ -452,9 +456,14 @@ getxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name, void __user *value,
error = vfs_getxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size);
if (error > 0) {
if ((strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == 0) ||
- (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0))
- posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(kvalue, size);
- if (size && copy_to_user(value, kvalue, error))
+ (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0)) {
+ int ret;
+ ret = posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(d->d_sb->s_user_ns,
+ kvalue, size);
+ if (ret)
+ error = ret;
+ }
+ if (error > 0 && size && copy_to_user(value, kvalue, error))
error = -EFAULT;
} else if (error == -ERANGE && size >= XATTR_SIZE_MAX) {
/* The file system tried to returned a value bigger
diff --git a/include/linux/posix_acl_xattr.h b/include/linux/posix_acl_xattr.h
index 6f14ee295822..db63c57357b4 100644
--- a/include/linux/posix_acl_xattr.h
+++ b/include/linux/posix_acl_xattr.h
@@ -53,14 +53,23 @@ posix_acl_xattr_count(size_t size)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
-void posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(void *value, size_t size);
-void posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(void *value, size_t size);
+int posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(struct user_namespace *target_ns,
+ void *value, size_t size);
+int posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(struct user_namespace *source_ns, void *value,
+ size_t size);
#else
-static inline void posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(void *value, size_t size)
+static inline int
+posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(struct user_namespace *target_ns, void *value,
+ size_t size)
{
+ return 0;
}
-static inline void posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(void *value, size_t size)
+
+static inline int
+posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user(struct user_namespace *source_ns, void *value,
+ size_t size)
{
+ return 0;
}
#endif
--
1.9.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-12-02 15:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-12-02 15:40 [PATCH 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 01/19] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 16:26 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 02/19] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 16:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 03/19] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 16:55 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 04/19] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 05/19] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 17:01 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 06/19] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 07/19] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 16:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 08/19] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 16:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 09/19] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 17:27 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-04 17:46 ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 19:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2015-12-04 18:50 ` [PATCH 10/19] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 11/19] fs: Ensure the mounter of a filesystem is privileged towards its inodes Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 19:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 12/19] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 19:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 13/19] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 19:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 14/19] fs: Permit FIBMAP for users with CAP_SYS_RAWIO in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 19:11 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-04 20:05 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-12-04 20:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-04 20:45 ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 23:11 ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-12-04 23:43 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-05 6:15 ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-05 0:00 ` Andreas Dilger
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 15/19] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set file caps Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 19:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-04 20:36 ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 22:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 16/19] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 17/19] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 15:38 ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 20:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-04 20:41 ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 21:57 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 18/19] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 20:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-04 20:43 ` Seth Forshee
2015-12-04 21:57 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-12-02 15:40 ` [PATCH 19/19] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1449070821-73820-11-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com \
--to=seth.forshee@canonical.com \
--cc=ahferroin7@gmail.com \
--cc=dm-devel@redhat.com \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net \
--cc=linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-raid@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=miklos@szeredi.hu \
--cc=richard.weinberger@gmail.com \
--cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=serge.hallyn@canonical.com \
--cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).