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From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 11/18] fs: Ensure the mounter of a filesystem is privileged towards its inodes
Date: Mon,  7 Dec 2015 15:21:20 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1449523289-144238-12-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1449523289-144238-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>

The mounter of a filesystem should be privileged towards the
inodes of that filesystem. Extend the checks in
inode_owner_or_capable() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid() to
permit access by users priviliged in the user namespace of the
inode's superblock.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/inode.c          |  3 +++
 kernel/capability.c | 13 +++++++++----
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
index 1be5f9003eb3..01c036fe1950 100644
--- a/fs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/inode.c
@@ -1962,6 +1962,9 @@ bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode)
 	ns = current_user_ns();
 	if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid))
 		return true;
+
+	if (ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_FOWNER))
+		return true;
 	return false;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_owner_or_capable);
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 45432b54d5c6..5137a38a5670 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -437,13 +437,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable);
  *
  * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at
  * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are
- * mapped into the current user namespace.
+ * mapped into the current user namespace, or if the current task has
+ * the capability towards the user namespace of the inode's superblock.
  */
 bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap)
 {
-	struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
+	struct user_namespace *ns;
 
-	return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
-		kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid);
+	ns = current_user_ns();
+	if (ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) &&
+	    kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid))
+		return true;
+
+	return ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, cap);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_wrt_inode_uidgid);
-- 
1.9.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-12-07 21:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-12-07 21:21 [PATCH v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 01/18] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 05/18] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2015-12-07 21:21 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee

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