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From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org,
	dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH RESEND v2 05/18] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns
Date: Mon,  4 Jan 2016 12:03:44 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1451930639-94331-6-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1451930639-94331-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>

All current callers of in_userns pass current_user_ns as the
first argument. Simplify by replacing in_userns with
current_in_userns which checks whether current_user_ns is in the
namespace supplied as an argument.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/namespace.c                 | 2 +-
 include/linux/user_namespace.h | 6 ++----
 kernel/user_namespace.c        | 6 +++---
 security/commoncap.c           | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 2101ce7b96ab..18fc58760aec 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -3286,7 +3286,7 @@ bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt)
 	 * in other namespaces.
 	 */
 	return !(mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) && check_mnt(real_mount(mnt)) &&
-	       in_userns(current_user_ns(), mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns);
+	       current_in_userns(mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns);
 }
 
 static struct ns_common *mntns_get(struct task_struct *task)
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index a43faa727124..9217169c64cb 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -72,8 +72,7 @@ extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t,
 extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
 extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
-extern bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
-		      const struct user_namespace *target_ns);
+extern bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns);
 #else
 
 static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
@@ -103,8 +102,7 @@ static inline bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static inline bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
-			     const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
+static inline bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
 {
 	return true;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 69fbc377357b..5960edc7e644 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -949,10 +949,10 @@ bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
  * Returns true if @ns is the same namespace as or a descendant of
  * @target_ns.
  */
-bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
-	       const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
+bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
 {
-	for (; ns; ns = ns->parent) {
+	struct user_namespace *ns;
+	for (ns = current_user_ns(); ns; ns = ns->parent) {
 		if (ns == target_ns)
 			return true;
 	}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 6243aef5860e..2119421613f6 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
 
 	if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
 		return 0;
-	if (!in_userns(current_user_ns(), bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
+	if (!current_in_userns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
-- 
1.9.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-01-04 18:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-04 18:03 [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 01/18] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 02/18] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 03/18] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2016-03-15 12:09   ` [PATCH] fs: remove excess check for in_userns Pavel Tikhomirov
2016-03-15 13:45     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-15 14:19       ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2016-03-15 14:19       ` Pavel Tikhomirov
2016-03-22 23:19       ` James Morris
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 04/18] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 06/18] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 07/18] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 08/18] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 09/18] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 10/18] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 11/18] fs: Ensure the mounter of a filesystem is privileged towards its inodes Seth Forshee
2016-03-03 17:02   ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-04 22:43     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-06 15:48       ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-06 22:07         ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-07 13:32           ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-28 16:59       ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-30  1:36         ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-30 14:58           ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-30 20:18             ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 12/18] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 13/18] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 14/18] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 15/18] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 10:53   ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:17     ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 16/18] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 11:29   ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:18     ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 14:48       ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 15:25         ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 15:51           ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 17:07             ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-14 20:58               ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-25 20:31                 ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 17/18] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 11:40   ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 18/18] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 13:08   ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-01-25 19:47 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-25 20:01   ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-25 20:36     ` Seth Forshee

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