From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>,
Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org,
dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
cgroups@vger.kernel.org,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 01/21] fs: fix a posible leak of allocated superblock
Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2016 10:38:18 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1461339521-123191-2-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1461339521-123191-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>
From: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
We probably need to fix superblock leak in patch (v4 "fs: Add user
namesapace member to struct super_block"):
Imagine posible code path in sget_userns: we iterate through
type->fs_supers and do not find suitable sb, we drop sb_lock to
allocate s and go to retry. After we dropped sb_lock some other
task from different userns takes sb_lock, it is already in retry
stage and has s allocated, so it puts its s in type->fs_supers
list. So in retry we will find these sb in list and check it has
a different userns, and finally we will return without freeing s.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
---
fs/super.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index 829841e0ae7e..092a7828442e 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -474,6 +474,10 @@ retry:
continue;
if (user_ns != old->s_user_ns) {
spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+ if (s) {
+ up_write(&s->s_umount);
+ destroy_super(s);
+ }
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
}
if (!grab_super(old))
--
1.9.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-04-22 15:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-22 15:38 [PATCH v3 00/21] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 02/21] fs: Remove check of s_user_ns for existing mounts in fs_fully_visible() Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 03/21] fs: Allow sysfs and cgroupfs to share super blocks between user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-25 19:01 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 04/21] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 05/21] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 06/21] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 07/21] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 08/21] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 09/21] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 10/21] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 11/21] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 12/21] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 13/21] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 14/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to change ownership of inodes with unmappable ids Seth Forshee
2016-04-25 20:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2016-04-25 20:54 ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 15/21] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 16/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 17/21] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 18/21] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 19/21] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 20/21] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2016-04-22 15:38 ` [PATCH v3 21/21] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
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