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From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: miklos@szeredi.hu, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, pmoore@redhat.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dwalsh@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk,
	vgoyal@redhat.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up_xattr() hook
Date: Fri,  8 Jul 2016 12:19:39 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1467994782-26474-5-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1467994782-26474-1-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com>

When a file is copied up in overlay, we have already created file on upper/
with right label and there is no need to copy up selinux label/xattr from
lower file to upper file. In fact in case of context mount, we don't want
to copy up label as newly created file got its label from context= option.

Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c82ee54..4fda548 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3290,6 +3290,21 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+	/* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
+	 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
+	 * xattrs up.  Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
+		return 1; /* Discard */
+	/*
+	 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
+	 * by selinux.
+	 */
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 /* file security operations */
 
 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -6077,6 +6092,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-07-08 16:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-08 16:19 [RFC PATCH 0/7][V2] Overlayfs SELinux Support Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 16:19 ` [PATCH 1/7] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files Vivek Goyal
2016-07-11 15:24   ` Stephen Smalley
2016-07-11 16:54     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 16:19 ` [PATCH 2/7] selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up() hook Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 16:19 ` [PATCH 3/7] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 17:41   ` kbuild test robot
2016-07-11 13:40     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-11 13:50       ` [kbuild-all] [PATCH 3/7] security, overlayfs: " Fengguang Wu
2016-07-12  0:02       ` [PATCH 3/7] security,overlayfs: " Stephen Rothwell
2016-07-11 15:31   ` Stephen Smalley
2016-07-11 16:56     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-11 17:02     ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 16:19 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2016-07-08 16:19 ` [PATCH 5/7] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label() Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 16:19 ` [PATCH 6/7] security, overlayfs: Provide hook to correctly label newly created files Vivek Goyal
2016-07-08 16:19 ` [PATCH 7/7] selinux: Implement dentry_create_files_as() hook Vivek Goyal

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