From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: miklos@szeredi.hu, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, pmoore@redhat.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dwalsh@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk,
vgoyal@redhat.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/9] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label()
Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2016 10:44:51 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1468421095-22322-6-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1468421095-22322-1-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of
current task. Soon I need this to work on a security pointer retrieved
from a set of creds. So start passing in a pointer and caller can decide
where to fetch security pointer from.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4fda548..ae11fd9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1785,13 +1785,13 @@ out:
/*
* Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
*/
-static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
- const struct qstr *name,
- u16 tclass,
- u32 *_new_isid)
+static int
+selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+ struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
+ u32 *_new_isid)
{
const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
(sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
@@ -1834,8 +1834,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
- &newsid);
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
+ &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2815,7 +2815,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
u32 newsid;
int rc;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+ d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
&newsid);
if (rc)
@@ -2840,7 +2841,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
sid = tsec->sid;
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
dir, qstr,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
&newsid);
--
2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-13 14:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-13 14:44 [RFC PATCH 0/9][V3] Overlayfs SELinux Support Vivek Goyal
2016-07-13 14:44 ` [PATCH 1/9] security, overlayfs: provide copy up security hook for unioned files Vivek Goyal
2016-07-13 14:52 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-07-13 14:56 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-13 15:13 ` Vivek Goyal
2016-07-14 14:32 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-07-13 14:44 ` [PATCH 2/9] selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up() hook Vivek Goyal
2016-07-13 14:53 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-07-13 14:44 ` [PATCH 3/9] security,overlayfs: Provide security hook for copy up of xattrs for overlay file Vivek Goyal
2016-07-14 14:20 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-07-13 14:44 ` [PATCH 4/9] selinux: Implementation for inode_copy_up_xattr() hook Vivek Goyal
2016-07-13 14:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-07-13 14:44 ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2016-07-13 14:56 ` [PATCH 5/9] selinux: Pass security pointer to determine_inode_label() Stephen Smalley
2016-07-13 14:44 ` [PATCH 6/9] security, overlayfs: Provide hook to correctly label newly created files Vivek Goyal
2016-07-13 14:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-07-13 14:59 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-07-14 14:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-07-13 14:44 ` [PATCH 7/9] selinux: Implement dentry_create_files_as() hook Vivek Goyal
2016-07-13 14:59 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-07-13 14:44 ` [PATCH 8/9] overlayfs: Dilute permission checks on lower only if not special file Vivek Goyal
2016-07-14 6:51 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-13 14:44 ` [PATCH 9/9] overlayfs: Append MAY_READ when diluting write checks Vivek Goyal
2016-07-14 6:49 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-21 21:16 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9][V3] Overlayfs SELinux Support Paul Moore
2016-07-21 23:09 ` James Morris
2016-07-22 7:05 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-22 15:33 ` Paul Moore
2016-08-08 12:46 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-08-08 13:18 ` Paul Moore
2016-08-09 1:19 ` Paul Moore
2016-08-10 9:11 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-08-10 12:32 ` Paul Moore
2016-08-10 12:52 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-08-11 12:36 ` Paul Moore
2016-08-11 12:39 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-08-11 14:06 ` Daniel J Walsh
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