From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Casey Schaufler Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/11] Security: Add hook to get full maclabel xattr name Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2008 18:07:53 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: <147227.75672.qm@web36609.mail.mud.yahoo.com> References: <1204245767.2715.43.camel@moss-terrapins.epoch.ncsc.mil> Reply-To: casey@schaufler-ca.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Cc: Stephen Smalley , casey@schaufler-ca.com, viro@ftp.linux.org.uk, trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no, bfields@fieldses.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, LSM List To: Dave Quigley , Christoph Hellwig Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1204245767.2715.43.camel@moss-terrapins.epoch.ncsc.mil> Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org --- Dave Quigley wrote: > > On Thu, 2008-02-28 at 20:00 -0500, Christoph Hellwig wrote: > > On Thu, Feb 28, 2008 at 07:32:47PM -0500, Dave Quigley wrote: > > > I can always go with the original hook name of get_security_xattr_name > > > which turns into a security_get_security_xattr_name call which seems a > > > bit ludicrous. The only other complaint that I saw from Casey besides > > > the name of the function was that there could be more than one xattr. If > > > we want to address that then I need another hook that says give me all > > > data that the LSM deems important for this file. Which is essentially > > > the same thing as taking each of the xattr names that the module will > > > provide, grabbing each of them in turn, and concatenating them together. > > > For SELinux this is no different than getsecurity with the selinux > > > suffix. The same goes for SMACK. > > > > What about Casey's suggestion of get_security_blob? For any reasonable > > module that just has a single xattr it's trivial and for those that > > have multiple or a different storage model it might get complicated > > but that's not our problem for now. > > If this is the method we are going to use then we need a corresponding > set_security_blob as well. Not to sound stupid, but why would you need this? > This seems like a paradigm shift for > accessing security information in the kernel. Well, yes, but look at David Howell's file cacheing work before you take too firm a stand. > I said to Casey in the > beginning that I'd be willing to revisit it but that neither he or I > alone could make the decision. Unless I misunderstood the original > mandate for security information and that it only applies to how user > space accesses it. Sorry, I don't understand how user space and mandates go together here. Casey Schaufler casey@schaufler-ca.com