From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@kernel.org>,
"Ben Hutchings" <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
"Hugh Dickins" <hughd@google.com>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"James Morris" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Greg Ungerer" <gerg@linux-m68k.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Nicolas Pitre" <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>,
"Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Vivek Goyal" <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] exec: Use sane stack rlimit for setuid exec
Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2017 12:56:58 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1499457420-83038-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
As discussed with Linus and Andy, we need to reset the stack rlimit
before we do memory layouts when execing a privilege-gaining (e.g.
setuid) program. This moves security_bprm_secureexec() earlier (with
required changes), and then lowers the stack limit when appropriate.
As a side-effect, dumpability is expanded to cover capabilities and
other LSM definitions of secureexec, and Smack can drop its special
handler for pdeath_signal clearing.
I'd appreciate some extra eyes on this to make sure this isn't
broken in some special way. I couldn't find anything that _depended_
on security_bprm_secureexec() being called late.
Thanks!
-Kees
next reply other threads:[~2017-07-07 19:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-07 19:56 Kees Cook [this message]
2017-07-07 19:56 ` [PATCH 1/2] exec: Move security_bprm_secureexec() earlier Kees Cook
2017-07-07 19:57 ` [PATCH 2/2] exec: Use sane stack rlimit for setuid exec Kees Cook
2017-07-07 20:04 ` [PATCH 0/2] " Linus Torvalds
2017-07-07 20:09 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-07-07 22:10 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-07 22:13 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-07 22:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-07-08 3:59 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-07 21:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-07 22:19 ` Kees Cook
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