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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@kernel.org>,
	"Ben Hutchings" <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
	"Hugh Dickins" <hughd@google.com>,
	"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"James Morris" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Greg Ungerer" <gerg@linux-m68k.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Nicolas Pitre" <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Vivek Goyal" <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return"
Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 00:57:24 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1499673451-66160-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1499673451-66160-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

In commit 221af7f87b97 ("Split 'flush_old_exec' into two functions"),
the comment about the point of no return should have stayed in
flush_old_exec() since it refers to "bprm->mm = NULL;" line, but prior
changes in commits c89681ed7d0e ("remove steal_locks()"), and
fd8328be874f ("sanitize handling of shared descriptor tables in failing
execve()") made it look like it meant the current->sas_ss_sp line instead.

The comment is referring to the fact that once bprm->mm is NULL, all
failures from a binfmt load_binary hook (e.g. load_elf_binary), will
get SEGV raised against current. Move this comment and expand the
explanation a bit, putting it above the assignment this time.

This also removes an erroneous commet about when credentials are being
installed. That has its own dedicated function, install_exec_creds(),
which carries a similar (and correct) comment, so remove the bogus comment
where installation is not actually happening.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 fs/exec.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 904199086490..7842ae661e34 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1285,7 +1285,14 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	if (retval)
 		goto out;
 
-	bprm->mm = NULL;		/* We're using it now */
+	/*
+	 * After clearing bprm->mm (to mark that current is using the
+	 * prepared mm now), we are at the point of no return. If
+	 * anything from here on returns an error, the check in
+	 * search_binary_handler() will kill current (since the mm has
+	 * been replaced).
+	 */
+	bprm->mm = NULL;
 
 	set_fs(USER_DS);
 	current->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD |
@@ -1332,7 +1339,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 {
 	arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);
 
-	/* This is the point of no return */
 	current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0;
 
 	if (uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) && gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid()))
@@ -1350,7 +1356,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	 */
 	current->mm->task_size = TASK_SIZE;
 
-	/* install the new credentials */
 	if (!uid_eq(bprm->cred->uid, current_euid()) ||
 	    !gid_eq(bprm->cred->gid, current_egid())) {
 		current->pdeath_signal = 0;
-- 
2.7.4

  reply	other threads:[~2017-07-10  7:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-10  7:57 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-10  7:57 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-07-10  8:46   ` [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-10 16:04     ` Kees Cook
     [not found]       ` <CAGXu5jKTaXLU+H6DnNuy6ggxcMDgo9G-wEmZ4RP=QneJaZuNDg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-10 17:07         ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18  6:39           ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 13:12             ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 13:42               ` Kees Cook
2017-07-10  7:57 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: Move security_bprm_secureexec() earlier Kees Cook
2017-07-10  8:57   ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-10 16:06     ` Kees Cook
     [not found]       ` <CAGXu5jLw6SsXM66x7ZHdj+Pb8Aepq7rHn1saNHRhq-wqk8p=4g-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-10 17:18         ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-11  2:07           ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18  6:45             ` Kees Cook
2017-07-10  7:57 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook
2017-07-10  7:57 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook
2017-07-10  7:57 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-10  7:57 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook
2017-07-10  7:57 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-10  7:57 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-10 14:08   ` Ben Hutchings

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