From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@kernel.org>,
"Ben Hutchings" <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
"Hugh Dickins" <hughd@google.com>,
"Oleg Nesterov" <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>,
"James Morris" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Greg Ungerer" <gerg@linux-m68k.org>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
"Nicolas Pitre" <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>,
"Stephen Smalley" <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Vivek Goyal" <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec
Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2017 00:57:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1499673451-66160-9-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1499673451-66160-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
For a secureexec, before memory layout selection has happened, reset the
stack rlimit to something sane to avoid the caller having control over
the resulting layouts.
$ ulimit -s
8192
$ ulimit -s unlimited
$ /bin/sh -c 'ulimit -s'
unlimited
$ sudo /bin/sh -c 'ulimit -s'
8192
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index e0186db02f90..1e3463854a16 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1343,6 +1343,16 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
/* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */
current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to
+ * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
+ * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
+ * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
+ * needing to clean up the change on failure.
+ */
+ if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
+ current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
}
arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);
--
2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-10 7:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-10 7:57 [PATCH v2 0/8] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Kees Cook
2017-07-10 8:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-10 16:04 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jKTaXLU+H6DnNuy6ggxcMDgo9G-wEmZ4RP=QneJaZuNDg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-10 17:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 6:39 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 13:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-18 13:42 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: Move security_bprm_secureexec() earlier Kees Cook
2017-07-10 8:57 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-10 16:06 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jLw6SsXM66x7ZHdj+Pb8Aepq7rHn1saNHRhq-wqk8p=4g-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-07-10 17:18 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-07-11 2:07 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-18 6:45 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-07-10 7:57 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-07-10 14:08 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Ben Hutchings
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