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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/5] ima: always measure and audit files in policy
Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2017 09:22:51 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1501075375-29469-2-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1501075375-29469-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

All files matching a "measure" rule must be included in the IMA
measurement list, even when the file hash cannot be calculated.
Similarly, all files matching an "audit" rule must be audited, even when
the file hash can not be calculated.

The file data hash field contained in the IMA measurement list template
data will contain 0's instead of the actual file hash digest.

Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

---
Changelog v4:
- Based on both -EBADF and -EINVAL
- clean up ima_collect_measurement()

 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c |  4 +--
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c2edba8de35e..bbf3ba8bbb09 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -199,37 +199,49 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 	int result = 0;
+	int length;
+	void *tmpbuf;
+	u64 i_version;
 	struct {
 		struct ima_digest_data hdr;
 		char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	} hash;
 
-	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
-		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
+	if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)
+		goto out;
 
-		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
-			audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
-			result = -EACCES;
-			goto out;
-		}
+	if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
+		audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
+		result = -EACCES;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
-		hash.hdr.algo = algo;
-
-		result = (!buf) ?  ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr) :
-			ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
-		if (!result) {
-			int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
-			void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length,
-						GFP_NOFS);
-			if (tmpbuf) {
-				iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
-				memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
-				iint->version = i_version;
-				iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
-			} else
-				result = -ENOMEM;
-		}
+	i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
+	hash.hdr.algo = algo;
+
+	/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
+	memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
+
+	result = (!buf) ?  ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr) :
+		ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
+
+	if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
+		goto out;
+
+	length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length;
+	tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!tmpbuf) {
+		result = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
 	}
+
+	iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
+	memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
+	iint->version = i_version;
+
+	/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. DAX, O_DIRECT) */
+	if (result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
+		iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED;
 out:
 	if (result)
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2aebb7984437..3941371402ff 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo);
-	if (rc != 0) {
+	if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL) {
 		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
 			rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
 		goto out_digsig;
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
 				      xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr);
-	if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
+	if ((rc == 0) && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK))
 		rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
 					      xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
-- 
2.7.4

  reply	other threads:[~2017-07-26 13:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-26 13:22 [PATCH v4 0/5] define new fs integrity_read method Mimi Zohar
2017-07-26 13:22 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2017-08-22  9:24   ` [Linux-ima-devel] [PATCH v4 1/5] ima: always measure and audit files in policy Dmitry Kasatkin
2017-07-26 13:22 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] ima: use fs method to read integrity data Mimi Zohar
2017-07-31  7:01   ` Jan Kara
2017-07-31 19:08     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-08-01 10:42       ` Jan Kara
2017-08-01 15:38         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-08-01 20:24   ` [PATCH v4 2/5] ima: use fs method to read integrity data [updated] Mimi Zohar
2017-08-02  8:01     ` Jan Kara
2017-08-02 17:11       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-08-03 10:56         ` Jan Kara
2017-08-04 21:07           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-08-07 10:04             ` Jan Kara
2017-08-07 20:12               ` Mimi Zohar
2017-08-08 11:17                 ` Jan Kara
2017-08-22  9:59   ` [PATCH v4 2/5] ima: use fs method to read integrity data Dmitry Kasatkin
2017-07-26 13:22 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] ima: define "dont_failsafe" policy action rule Mimi Zohar
2017-08-22  9:34   ` [Linux-ima-devel] " Dmitry Kasatkin
2017-08-22  9:39     ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2017-07-26 13:22 ` [PATCH v4 4/5] ima: define "fs_unsafe" builtin policy Mimi Zohar
2017-08-22  9:36   ` [Linux-ima-devel] " Dmitry Kasatkin
2017-07-26 13:22 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] ima: remove permit_directio policy option Mimi Zohar
2017-08-22  9:27   ` [Linux-ima-devel] " Dmitry Kasatkin

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