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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 06/15] smack: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook
Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 16:51:24 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1501545093-56634-7-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1501545093-56634-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

The Smack bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).

Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook,
and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped.

Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 21 ++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 7d4b2e221124..4f1967be3d20 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -950,6 +950,10 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
 	bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
 
+	/* Decide if this is a secure exec. */
+	if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
+		bprm->secureexec = 1;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -967,22 +971,6 @@ static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		current->pdeath_signal = 0;
 }
 
-/**
- * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec.
- * @bprm: binprm for exec
- *
- * Returns 0 on success.
- */
-static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
-
-	if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
-		return 1;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /*
  * Inode hooks
  */
@@ -4646,7 +4634,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-07-31 23:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-07-31 23:51 [PATCH v4 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 01/15] exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 02/15] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 03/15] binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag Kees Cook
2017-08-01  0:23   ` Kees Cook
2017-08-01  0:44   ` James Morris
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 04/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 05/15] selinux: " Kees Cook
2017-08-01  0:45   ` James Morris
2017-08-01 13:24   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-31 23:51 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-08-01  0:46   ` [PATCH v4 06/15] smack: " James Morris
2017-08-01 15:24   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 07/15] commoncap: " Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 08/15] commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-08-01 13:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 09/15] LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 10/15] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook
2017-08-01  0:48   ` James Morris
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 11/15] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook
2017-08-01  0:50   ` James Morris
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 12/15] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-08-01  0:50   ` James Morris
2017-08-01 15:24   ` Casey Schaufler
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 13/15] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 14/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 15/15] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-08-01  0:52   ` James Morris
2017-08-01  0:34 ` [PATCH v4 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-08-01  0:54   ` James Morris
2017-08-01  3:03     ` Kees Cook
2017-08-01  5:11       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-08-01  5:14         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-08-01 15:04         ` Kees Cook
2017-08-01 20:19           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-08-01 21:04             ` Kees Cook

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