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* [PATCH v2 04/30] dcache: Define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache
       [not found] <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
@ 2017-08-28 21:34 ` Kees Cook
  2017-08-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 05/30] vfs: Define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches Kees Cook
  2017-08-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 06/30] vfs: Copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2017-08-28 21:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Kees Cook, David Windsor, Alexander Viro, linux-fsdevel, linux-mm,
	kernel-hardening

From: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>

When a dentry name is short enough, it can be stored directly in the
dentry itself (instead in a separate kmalloc allocation). These dentry
short names, stored in struct dentry.d_iname and therefore contained in
the dentry_cache slab cache, need to be coped to userspace.

cache object allocation:
    fs/dcache.c:
        __d_alloc(...):
            ...
            dentry = kmem_cache_alloc(dentry_cache, ...);
            ...
            dentry->d_name.name = dentry->d_iname;

example usage trace:
    filldir+0xb0/0x140
    dcache_readdir+0x82/0x170
    iterate_dir+0x142/0x1b0
    SyS_getdents+0xb5/0x160

    fs/readdir.c:
        (called via ctx.actor by dir_emit)
        filldir(..., const char *name, ...):
            ...
            copy_to_user(..., name, namlen)

    fs/libfs.c:
        dcache_readdir(...):
            ...
            next = next_positive(dentry, p, 1)
            ...
            dir_emit(..., next->d_name.name, ...)

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
dentry_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed.

This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can
now check that each copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls
entirely within the slab's usercopy region.

This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust hunks for kmalloc-specific things moved later]
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 fs/dcache.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
index f90141387f01..5f5e7c1fcf4b 100644
--- a/fs/dcache.c
+++ b/fs/dcache.c
@@ -3603,8 +3603,9 @@ static void __init dcache_init(void)
 	 * but it is probably not worth it because of the cache nature
 	 * of the dcache.
 	 */
-	dentry_cache = KMEM_CACHE(dentry,
-		SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT);
+	dentry_cache = KMEM_CACHE_USERCOPY(dentry,
+		SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
+		d_iname);
 
 	/* Hash may have been set up in dcache_init_early */
 	if (!hashdist)
-- 
2.7.4

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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2 05/30] vfs: Define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches
       [not found] <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
  2017-08-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 04/30] dcache: Define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache Kees Cook
@ 2017-08-28 21:34 ` Kees Cook
  2017-08-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 06/30] vfs: Copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2017-08-28 21:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Kees Cook, David Windsor, Alexander Viro, linux-fsdevel, linux-mm,
	kernel-hardening

From: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>

VFS pathnames are stored in the names_cache slab cache, either inline
or across an entire allocation entry (when approaching PATH_MAX). These
are copied to/from userspace, so they must be entirely whitelisted.

cache object allocation:
    include/linux/fs.h:
        #define __getname()    kmem_cache_alloc(names_cachep, GFP_KERNEL)

example usage trace:
    strncpy_from_user+0x4d/0x170
    getname_flags+0x6f/0x1f0
    user_path_at_empty+0x23/0x40
    do_mount+0x69/0xda0
    SyS_mount+0x83/0xd0

    fs/namei.c:
        getname_flags(...):
            ...
            result = __getname();
            ...
            kname = (char *)result->iname;
            result->name = kname;
            len = strncpy_from_user(kname, filename, EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX);
            ...
            if (unlikely(len == EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX)) {
                const size_t size = offsetof(struct filename, iname[1]);
                kname = (char *)result;

                result = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
                ...
                result->name = kname;
                len = strncpy_from_user(kname, filename, PATH_MAX);

In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines the entire cache
object in the names_cache slab cache as whitelisted, since it may entirely
hold name strings to be copied to/from userspace.

This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, add usage trace]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 fs/dcache.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
index 5f5e7c1fcf4b..34ef9a9169be 100644
--- a/fs/dcache.c
+++ b/fs/dcache.c
@@ -3642,8 +3642,8 @@ void __init vfs_caches_init_early(void)
 
 void __init vfs_caches_init(void)
 {
-	names_cachep = kmem_cache_create("names_cache", PATH_MAX, 0,
-			SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+	names_cachep = kmem_cache_create_usercopy("names_cache", PATH_MAX, 0,
+			SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, 0, PATH_MAX, NULL);
 
 	dcache_init();
 	inode_init();
-- 
2.7.4

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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2 06/30] vfs: Copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user()
       [not found] <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
  2017-08-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 04/30] dcache: Define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache Kees Cook
  2017-08-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 05/30] vfs: Define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches Kees Cook
@ 2017-08-28 21:34 ` Kees Cook
  2 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2017-08-28 21:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-kernel
  Cc: Kees Cook, David Windsor, Alexander Viro, linux-fsdevel, linux-mm,
	kernel-hardening

From: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>

The mnt_id field can be copied with put_user(), so there is no need to
use copy_to_user(). In both cases, hardened usercopy is being bypassed
since the size is constant, and not open to runtime manipulation.

This patch is verbatim from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log]
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 fs/fhandle.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c
index 58a61f55e0d0..46e00ccca8f0 100644
--- a/fs/fhandle.c
+++ b/fs/fhandle.c
@@ -68,8 +68,7 @@ static long do_sys_name_to_handle(struct path *path,
 	} else
 		retval = 0;
 	/* copy the mount id */
-	if (copy_to_user(mnt_id, &real_mount(path->mnt)->mnt_id,
-			 sizeof(*mnt_id)) ||
+	if (put_user(real_mount(path->mnt)->mnt_id, mnt_id) ||
 	    copy_to_user(ufh, handle,
 			 sizeof(struct file_handle) + handle_bytes))
 		retval = -EFAULT;
-- 
2.7.4

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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2017-08-28 21:34 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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     [not found] <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
2017-08-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 04/30] dcache: Define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache Kees Cook
2017-08-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 05/30] vfs: Define usercopy region in names_cache slab caches Kees Cook
2017-08-28 21:34 ` [PATCH v2 06/30] vfs: Copy struct mount.mnt_id to userspace using put_user() Kees Cook

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