From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Message-ID: <1515078515.3864.8.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Intel SGX Driver From: James Bottomley To: Cedric Blancher , Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, Linux Kernel Mailing List , Borislav Petkov , "David S. Miller" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Grzegorz Andrejczuk , Haim Cohen , Ingo Molnar , Janakarajan Natarajan , Jim Mattson , Kan Liang , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Kyle Huey , Len Brown , "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , "open list:FILESYSTEMS (VFS and infrastructure)" , Mauro Carvalho Chehab , Paolo Bonzini , Piotr Luc , Radim =?UTF-8?Q?Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= , Randy Dunlap , Sean Christopherson , Thomas Gleixner , Tom Lendacky , Vikas Shivappa Date: Thu, 04 Jan 2018 07:08:35 -0800 In-Reply-To: References: <20171125193132.24321-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 15:17 +0100, Cedric Blancher wrote: > So how does this protect against the MELTDOWN attack (CVE-2017-5754) > and the MELTATOMBOMBA4 worm which uses this exploit? Actually, a data exfiltration attack against SGX, using page tables has already been documented: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity17/technical-sessions/presentation/van-bulck It doesn't exploit speculation as the mechanism for gathering data (it exploits page faults), but the structure of the side channel attack used to exfiltrate data from the supposedly secure enclave is very similar to Spectre.  The targetting mechanism is very different, though: the page table exploit assumes you can control the page tables, so you must be highly privileged on the platform but with Spectre you merely have to be an ordinary user. James