From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>, Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] ima: fail signature verification on untrusted filesystems
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 18:03:13 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1519254193.19593.32.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87fu5uc5ug.fsf@xmission.com>
On Wed, 2018-02-21 at 16:53 -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>
> > On Mon, 2018-02-19 at 20:02 -0600, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >> It would also be nice if I could provide all of this information at
> >> mount time (when I am the global root) with mount options. So I don't
> >> need to update all of my tooling to know how to update ima policy when I
> >> am mounting a filesystem.
> >
> > The latest version of this patch relies on a builtin IMA policy to set
> > a flag. No other changes are required to the IMA policy. This
> > builtin policy could be used for environments not willing to accept
> > the default unverifiable signature risk.
>
> I still remain puzzled by this. Why is the default to accept the risk?
Accepting the risk is option 2, the privileged mount scenario. It
requires re-evaluating the cached info.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-21 23:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-19 15:18 [PATCH v1 0/2] ima: untrusted filesystems Mimi Zohar
2018-02-19 15:18 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] ima: fail signature verification on " Mimi Zohar
2018-02-19 21:47 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-02-20 0:52 ` James Morris
2018-02-20 2:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-02-20 14:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-20 20:16 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-02-21 14:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-21 22:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-02-21 22:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-21 23:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-02-21 23:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-27 2:12 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-02-21 22:53 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-02-21 23:03 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2018-02-19 22:50 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-19 23:36 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-19 15:18 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted Mimi Zohar
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