From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>, Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] ima: fail signature verification based on policy
Date: Fri, 02 Mar 2018 16:10:15 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1520025015.10396.142.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180228153015.GA30654@mail.hallyn.com>
On Wed, 2018-02-28 at 09:30 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> > On Tue, 2018-02-27 at 16:35 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > Quoting Mimi Zohar (zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> > > > This patch addresses the fuse privileged mounted filesystems in
> > > > environments which are unwilling to accept the risk of trusting the
> > > > signature verification and want to always fail safe, but are for
> > > > example using a pre-built kernel.
> > > >
> > > > This patch defines a new builtin policy "unverifiable_sigs", which can
> > >
> > > How about recalc_unverifiable_sigs?
> >
> > Cute, I really like that name, but in this case we're failing the
> > signature verification.
> >
> > > It's long, but unverifiable_sigs
> > > is not clear about whether the intent is to accept or recalculate them.
> > >
> > > (or fail_unverifiable_sigs like the flag)
> >
> > Could we abbreviate it to "fail_usigs"? Or perhaps allow both
> > "fail_unverifiable_sigs" and "fail_usigs".
>
> That sounds good. Or fail_unverified? But so long as 'fail' is somehow
> clearly implied by the name.
None of these names mean anything to anyone but us. How about
"fail_safe"? That at least has some meaning to some people.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-02 21:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-22 21:33 [PATCH v2 0/4] ima: unverifiable file signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-02-22 21:33 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems Mimi Zohar
2018-02-27 1:47 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-02-27 15:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-22 21:33 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] ima: re-evaluate files on privileged " Mimi Zohar
2018-02-22 21:33 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] ima: fail signature verification based on policy Mimi Zohar
2018-02-27 22:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-02-28 11:38 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-02-28 15:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-02 21:10 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2018-02-22 21:33 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted Mimi Zohar
2018-02-23 4:00 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] ima: unverifiable file signatures James Morris
2018-02-27 2:08 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-02-27 16:17 ` Mimi Zohar
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