From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>, Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted
Date: Mon, 19 Mar 2018 07:57:43 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1521460663.3503.127.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87a7vbydn9.fsf@xmission.com>
Hi Miklos,
On Tue, 2018-03-13 at 14:32 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>
> > Files on FUSE can change at any point in time without IMA being able
> > to detect it. The file data read for the file signature verification
> > could be totally different from what is subsequently read, making the
> > signature verification useless.
> >
> > FUSE can be mounted by unprivileged users either today with fusermount
> > installed with setuid, or soon with the upcoming patches to allow FUSE
> > mounts in a non-init user namespace.
> >
> > This patch sets the SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE flag and when
> > appropriate sets the SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER flag.
>
> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
There's been a number of changes since the original version of this
patch set. I would appreciate your Ack for this version?
Thanks,
Mimi
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
> > Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> > Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> > Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
> > Cc: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
> > Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
> > ---
> > fs/fuse/inode.c | 3 +++
> > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c
> > index 624f18bbfd2b..ef309958e060 100644
> > --- a/fs/fuse/inode.c
> > +++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c
> > @@ -1080,6 +1080,9 @@ static int fuse_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
> > sb->s_maxbytes = MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
> > sb->s_time_gran = 1;
> > sb->s_export_op = &fuse_export_operations;
> > + sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE;
> > + if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
> > + sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER;
> >
> > file = fget(d.fd);
> > err = -EINVAL;
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-19 11:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-08 20:24 [PATCH v3 0/4] unverifiable file signatures Mimi Zohar
2018-03-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems Mimi Zohar
2018-03-12 19:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-12 19:26 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-13 18:45 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] ima: re-evaluate files on privileged " Mimi Zohar
2018-03-12 19:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-13 19:24 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] ima: fail signature verification based on policy Mimi Zohar
2018-03-12 19:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-12 19:32 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-13 19:31 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-08 20:24 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted Mimi Zohar
2018-03-12 19:29 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-13 14:46 ` Stefan Berger
2018-03-14 14:27 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-14 14:37 ` Stefan Berger
2018-03-13 19:32 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-19 11:57 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2018-03-14 7:52 ` Stef Bon
2018-03-14 13:01 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-14 16:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-14 17:50 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-14 18:08 ` Chuck Lever
2018-03-14 19:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-14 20:34 ` Chuck Lever
2018-03-14 21:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-14 22:53 ` Michael Halcrow
2018-03-15 21:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-15 10:07 ` Stef Bon
2018-03-15 13:53 ` Chuck Lever
2018-03-15 22:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-13 19:40 ` [PATCH v3 0/4] unverifiable file signatures Eric W. Biederman
2018-03-13 20:40 ` Mimi Zohar
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