From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:59592 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728945AbeLMMRO (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Dec 2018 07:17:14 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id wBDC4cMe097635 for ; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 07:17:13 -0500 Received: from e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.98]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2pbn72p9fu-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 07:17:13 -0500 Received: from localhost by e06smtp02.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 12:17:11 -0000 Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/5] Add support for O_MAYEXEC From: Mimi Zohar To: Florian Weimer Cc: Matthew Wilcox , =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Al Viro , James Morris , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Matthew Garrett , Michael Kerrisk , =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= , Philippe =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Tr=E9buchet?= , Shuah Khan , Thibaut Sautereau , Vincent Strubel , Yves-Alexis Perez , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 07:16:52 -0500 In-Reply-To: <874lbhoef3.fsf@oldenburg2.str.redhat.com> References: <20181212081712.32347-1-mic@digikod.net> <20181213030228.GM6830@bombadil.infradead.org> <1544699060.6703.11.camel@linux.ibm.com> <874lbhoef3.fsf@oldenburg2.str.redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Message-Id: <1544703412.6703.46.camel@linux.ibm.com> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: [Cc'ing linux-integrity] On Thu, 2018-12-13 at 12:26 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote: > * Mimi Zohar: > > > The indication needs to be set during file open, before the open > > returns to the caller.  This is the point where ima_file_check() > > verifies the file's signature.  On failure, access to the file is > > denied. > > Does this verification happen for open with O_PATH? Interesting!  According to the manpage, userspace cannot read/write to the file.  It looks like do_o_path() intentionally skips do_last(), with the call to ima_file_check().  If the file data isn't being accessed, does the file's integrity need to be verified? Mimi