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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,  brauner@kernel.org,
	chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de,
	 kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
	paul@paul-moore.com,  jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com,  dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
	dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
	 stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
	mic@digikod.net
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	 selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 11/23] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 18:31:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1999ed6f77100d9d2adc613c9748f15ab8fcf432.camel@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <85c5dda2-5a2f-4c73-82ae-8a333b69b4a7@schaufler-ca.com>

On Tue, 2023-11-07 at 09:33 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 11/7/2023 5:40 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > 
> > In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
> > the inode_post_removexattr hook.
> > 
> > At inode_removexattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
> > inode_post_removexattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed
> > xattr removed and other file metadata.
> > 
> > Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful xattr removal.
> > 
> > The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
> > reverted.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> > ---
> >  fs/xattr.c                    |  9 +++++----
> >  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  2 ++
> >  include/linux/security.h      |  5 +++++
> >  security/security.c           | 14 ++++++++++++++
> >  4 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
> > index 09d927603433..84a4aa566c02 100644
> > --- a/fs/xattr.c
> > +++ b/fs/xattr.c
> > @@ -552,11 +552,12 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> >  		goto out;
> >  
> >  	error = __vfs_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
> > +	if (error)
> > +		goto out;
> 
> Shouldn't this be simply "return error" rather than a goto to nothing
> but "return error"?

I got a review from Andrew Morton. His argument seems convincing, that
having less return places makes the code easier to handle.

Thanks

Roberto

> > -	if (!error) {
> > -		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
> > -		evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
> > -	}
> > +	fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
> > +	security_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
> > +	evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
> >  
> >  out:
> >  	return error;
> > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > index 67410e085205..88452e45025c 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > @@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getxattr, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
> >  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listxattr, struct dentry *dentry)
> >  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_removexattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> >  	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
> > +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
> > +	 const char *name)
> >  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> >  	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
> >  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> > index 664df46b22a9..922ea7709bae 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/security.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> > @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
> >  int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
> >  int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> >  			       struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
> > +void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
> >  int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> >  int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry);
> >  int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> > @@ -940,6 +941,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> >  	return cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
> >  }
> >  
> > +static inline void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> > +						   const char *name)
> > +{ }
> > +
> >  static inline int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> >  {
> >  	return cap_inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
> > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > index ce3bc7642e18..8aa6e9f316dd 100644
> > --- a/security/security.c
> > +++ b/security/security.c
> > @@ -2452,6 +2452,20 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> >  	return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
> >  }
> >  
> > +/**
> > + * security_inode_post_removexattr() - Update the inode after a removexattr op
> > + * @dentry: file
> > + * @name: xattr name
> > + *
> > + * Update the inode after a successful removexattr operation.
> > + */
> > +void security_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
> > +{
> > +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> > +		return;
> > +	call_void_hook(inode_post_removexattr, dentry, name);
> > +}
> > +
> >  /**
> >   * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required
> >   * @dentry: associated dentry


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-20 17:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-07 13:39 [PATCH v5 00/23] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v5 01/23] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:21   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v5 02/23] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:22   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v5 03/23] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:23   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v5 04/23] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:24   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v5 05/23] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:25   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v5 06/23] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:26   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v5 07/23] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:27   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v5 08/23] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:28   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v5 09/23] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 13:39 ` [PATCH v5 10/23] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:30   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-16  4:33   ` Paul Moore
2023-11-16  9:43     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-16 18:46       ` Paul Moore
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 11/23] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:33   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 17:45     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:31     ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2023-11-20 18:03       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-20 20:55         ` Paul Moore
2023-11-16  4:33   ` Paul Moore
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 12/23] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:35   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 13/23] security: Introduce file_pre_free_security hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:39   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-16  4:33   ` Paul Moore
2023-11-16  9:46     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-16 18:41       ` Paul Moore
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 14/23] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:41   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 15/23] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:42   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-16  4:33   ` Paul Moore
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 16/23] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:44   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-16  4:33   ` Paul Moore
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 17/23] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:45   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-16  4:33   ` Paul Moore
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 18/23] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:47   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 19/23] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 17:52   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 20/23] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 18:43   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 21/23] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 18:45   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 22/23] integrity: Move integrity functions to the " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 18:46   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-16  4:33   ` Paul Moore
2023-11-16 10:07     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-17 21:22       ` Paul Moore
2023-11-20 13:23         ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 13:40 ` [PATCH v5 23/23] integrity: Switch from rbtree to LSM-managed blob for integrity_iint_cache Roberto Sassu
2023-11-17 20:57   ` Paul Moore
2023-11-20  8:16     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 21:06       ` Paul Moore
2023-11-29 12:27         ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-29 13:58           ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-29 17:22           ` Paul Moore
2023-11-29 18:46             ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-30  0:41               ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-30  8:30                 ` Petr Tesarik
2023-11-30 16:15                   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-30 21:34                     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-30 23:31                       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-30 23:43                         ` Roberto Sassu
2023-12-01  0:12                           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-30 11:12               ` Mimi Zohar
2023-11-30 16:59                 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-30 17:00                   ` Paul Moore
2023-11-30 16:34               ` Paul Moore
2023-11-30 21:56                 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-12-04 13:26                 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-12-04 15:01                   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-12-06 13:10                   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-12-06 16:11                     ` Mimi Zohar
2023-12-06 16:50                       ` Roberto Sassu
2023-12-01  1:05               ` Dr. Greg
2023-12-01 18:54                 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-12-01 23:53                   ` Dr. Greg
2023-12-02  0:17                     ` Casey Schaufler
2023-12-13 10:45     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-12-13 18:08       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-07 14:05 ` [PATCH v5 00/23] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-11-07 19:37   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-11-08  3:14   ` Paul Moore

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