From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Andrew Morton Subject: Re: [patch 8/8] allow unprivileged fuse mounts Date: Sat, 21 Apr 2007 00:55:16 -0700 Message-ID: <20070421005516.18e0c797.akpm@linux-foundation.org> References: <20070420102532.385211890@szeredi.hu> <20070420102656.364689151@szeredi.hu> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: serue@us.ibm.com, viro@ftp.linux.org.uk, linuxram@us.ibm.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.osdl.org To: Miklos Szeredi Return-path: Received: from smtp1.linux-foundation.org ([65.172.181.25]:49905 "EHLO smtp1.linux-foundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1030351AbXDUH45 (ORCPT ); Sat, 21 Apr 2007 03:56:57 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20070420102656.364689151@szeredi.hu> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org On Fri, 20 Apr 2007 12:25:40 +0200 Miklos Szeredi wrote: > Use FS_SAFE for "fuse" fs type, but not for "fuseblk". > > FUSE was designed from the beginning to be safe for unprivileged > users. This has also been verified in practice over many years. How does FUSE do this? There are obvious cases like crafting a filesystem which has setuid executables or world-writeable device nodes or whatever. I'm sure there are lots of other cases. Where is FUSE's implementation of all this protection described?