From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Lars Marowsky-Bree Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching Date: Fri, 22 Jun 2007 14:42:04 +0200 Message-ID: <20070622124204.GR20105@marowsky-bree.de> References: <46732124.80509@novell.com> <20070616000251.GG2616@elf.ucw.cz> <20070621160840.GA20105@marowsky-bree.de> <20070621183311.GC18990@elf.ucw.cz> <20070621192407.GF20105@marowsky-bree.de> <20070621195400.GK20105@marowsky-bree.de> <1182459594.20464.16.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <20070622080640.GB14593@suse.de> <1182513228.24664.24.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE Cc: James Morris , Pavel Machek , Crispin Cowan , Greg KH , Andreas Gruenbacher , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org To: Stephen Smalley , John Johansen Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1182513228.24664.24.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org On 2007-06-22T07:53:47, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > No the "incomplete" mediation does not flow from the design. We ha= ve > > deliberately focused on doing the necessary modifications for pathn= ame > > based mediation. The IPC and network mediation are a wip. > The fact that you have to go back to the drawing board for them is th= at > you didn't get the abstraction right in the first place. That's an interesting claim, however I don't think it holds. AA was designed to mediate file access in a form which is intuitive to admins. It's to be expected that it doesn't directly apply to mediating other forms of access. > I think we must have different understandings of the words "generaliz= e" > and "analyzable". Look, if I want to be able to state properties abo= ut > data flow in the system for confidentiality or integrity goals (my > secret data can never leak to unauthorized entities, my critical data > can never be corrupted/tainted by unauthorized entities - directly or > indirectly), I seem to think that this is not what AA is trying to do, so evaluating it in that context doesn't seem useful. It's like saying a screw driver isn't a hammer, so it is useless because you have a nail. Regards, Lars --=20 Teamlead Kernel, SuSE Labs, Research and Development SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG N=FCrnberg) "Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes." -- Oscar Wil= de - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-securit= y-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html