From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: torvalds@osdl.org, akpm@osdl.org, steved@redhat.com,
trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-cachefs@redhat.com,
nfsv4@linux-nfs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 12/14] CacheFiles: Get the SID under which the CacheFiles module should operate
Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2007 21:25:56 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20070731202556.6412.93016.stgit@warthog.cambridge.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20070731202454.6412.88646.stgit@warthog.cambridge.redhat.com>
Get the SID under which the CacheFiles module should operate so that the
SELinux security system can control the accesses it makes.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
security/dummy.c | 7 +++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 +++++++
3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 21cadea..9cb417e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1164,6 +1164,14 @@ struct request_sock;
* owning security ID, and return the security ID as which the process was
* previously acting.
*
+ * @cachefiles_get_secid:
+ * Determine the security ID for the CacheFiles module to use when
+ * accessing the filesystem containing the cache.
+ * @secid contains the security ID under which cachefiles daemon is
+ * running.
+ * @modsecid contains the pointer to where the security ID for the module
+ * is to be stored.
+ *
* This is the main security structure.
*/
struct security_operations {
@@ -1352,6 +1360,7 @@ struct security_operations {
u32 (*set_fscreate_secid)(u32 secid);
u32 (*act_as_secid)(u32 secid);
u32 (*act_as_self)(void);
+ int (*cachefiles_get_secid)(u32 secid, u32 *modsecid);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct socket * sock,
@@ -2176,6 +2185,11 @@ static inline u32 security_act_as_self(void)
return security_ops->act_as_self();
}
+static inline int security_cachefiles_get_secid(u32 secid, u32 *modsecid)
+{
+ return security_ops->cachefiles_get_secid(secid, modsecid);
+}
+
/* prototypes */
extern int security_init (void);
extern int register_security (struct security_operations *ops);
@@ -2883,6 +2897,12 @@ static inline u32 security_act_as_self(void)
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_cachefiles_get_secid(u32 secid, u32 *modsecid)
+{
+ *modsecid = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 6a7a317..2c1fd16 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -955,6 +955,12 @@ static u32 dummy_act_as_self(void)
return 0;
}
+static int dummy_cachefiles_get_secid(u32 secid, u32 *modsecid)
+{
+ *modsecid = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static inline int dummy_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *ctx,
unsigned long flags)
@@ -1114,6 +1120,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, set_fscreate_secid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, act_as_secid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, act_as_self);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, cachefiles_get_secid);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ffe5c02..76650cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4719,6 +4719,12 @@ static u32 selinux_act_as_self(void)
return oldactor_sid;
}
+static int selinux_cachefiles_get_secid(u32 secid, u32 *modsecid)
+{
+ return security_transition_sid(secid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, modsecid);
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
@@ -4906,6 +4912,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.set_fscreate_secid = selinux_set_fscreate_secid,
.act_as_secid = selinux_act_as_secid,
.act_as_self = selinux_act_as_self,
+ .cachefiles_get_secid = selinux_cachefiles_get_secid,
.unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
.unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-07-31 20:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-07-31 20:24 [PATCH 00/14] Permit filesystem local caching David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` [PATCH 01/14] FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed readahead David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` [PATCH 02/14] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management David Howells
2007-08-01 6:17 ` Peter Zijlstra
2007-08-01 8:27 ` David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` [PATCH 03/14] FS-Cache: Provide an add_wait_queue_tail() function David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` [PATCH 04/14] FS-Cache: Generic filesystem caching facility David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` [PATCH 05/14] CacheFiles: Add missing copy_page export for ia64 David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` [PATCH 06/14] CacheFiles: Add a hook to write a single page of data to an inode David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` [PATCH 07/14] CacheFiles: Permit the page lock state to be monitored David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` [PATCH 08/14] CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` [PATCH 09/14] CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to be overridden David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` [PATCH 10/14] CacheFiles: Add an act-as SID override in task_security_struct David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` [PATCH 11/14] CacheFiles: Permit an inode's security ID to be obtained David Howells
2007-07-31 20:25 ` David Howells [this message]
2007-07-31 20:26 ` [PATCH 13/14] CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem David Howells
2007-07-31 20:26 ` [PATCH 14/14] NFS: Use local caching David Howells
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