From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: miklos@szeredi.hu
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] VFS: allow filesystem to override mknod capability checks
Date: Thu, 9 Aug 2007 14:20:45 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20070809192045.GA16682@vino.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20070809152909.203254312@szeredi.hu>
Quoting miklos@szeredi.hu (miklos@szeredi.hu):
> From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
>
> Add a new filesystem flag, that results in the VFS not checking if the
> current process has enough privileges to do an mknod().
>
> This is needed on filesystems, where an unprivileged user may be able
> to create a device node, without causing security problems.
>
> One such example is "mountlo" a loopback mount utility implemented
> with fuse and UML, which runs as an unprivileged userspace process.
> In this case the user does in fact have the right to create device
> nodes within the filesystem image, as long as the user has write
> access to the image. Since the filesystem is mounted with "nodev",
> adding device nodes is not a security concern.
Could we enforce at do_new_mount() that if
type->fs_flags&FS_MKNOD_CHECKS_PERM then mnt_flags |= MS_NODEV?
> This feature is basically "fuse-only", so it does not make sense to
> change the semantics of ->mknod().
>
> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
> ---
>
> Index: linux/fs/namei.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/fs/namei.c 2007-08-09 16:49:07.000000000 +0200
> +++ linux/fs/namei.c 2007-08-09 16:49:12.000000000 +0200
> @@ -1921,7 +1921,8 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct
> if (error)
> return error;
>
> - if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && !capable(CAP_MKNOD))
> + if (!(dir->i_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_MKNOD_CHECKS_PERM) &&
> + (S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && !capable(CAP_MKNOD))
> return -EPERM;
>
> if (!dir->i_op || !dir->i_op->mknod)
> Index: linux/include/linux/fs.h
> ===================================================================
> --- linux.orig/include/linux/fs.h 2007-08-09 16:49:07.000000000 +0200
> +++ linux/include/linux/fs.h 2007-08-09 16:49:12.000000000 +0200
> @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ extern int dir_notify_enable;
> #define FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA 2
> #define FS_HAS_SUBTYPE 4
> #define FS_SAFE 8 /* Safe to mount by unprivileged users */
> +#define FS_MKNOD_CHECKS_PERM 16 /* FS checks if device creation is allowed */
> #define FS_REVAL_DOT 16384 /* Check the paths ".", ".." for staleness */
> #define FS_RENAME_DOES_D_MOVE 32768 /* FS will handle d_move()
> * during rename() internally.
>
> --
> -
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
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> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-08-09 19:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-08-09 15:27 [RFC PATCH 0/4] VFS updates miklos
2007-08-09 15:27 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] pass open file to ->setattr() miklos
2007-08-09 15:35 ` J. Bruce Fields
2007-08-09 15:41 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-08-09 15:27 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] pass open file to ->getattr() miklos
2007-08-09 15:27 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] allow filesystems to implement atomic open+truncate miklos
2007-08-09 15:27 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] VFS: allow filesystem to override mknod capability checks miklos
2007-08-09 19:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2007-08-09 20:10 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-08-10 14:44 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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