From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: serue@us.ibm.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, hch@infradead.org,
viro@ftp.linux.org.uk, kzak@redhat.com,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
containers@lists.osdl.org, util-linux-ng@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 07/10] unprivileged mounts: add sysctl tunable for "safe" property
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 14:48:28 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080122204828.GA1212@sergelap.austin.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <E1JH4Kz-0006gt-MC@pomaz-ex.szeredi.hu>
Quoting Miklos Szeredi (miklos@szeredi.hu):
> > What do you think about doing this only if FS_SAFE is also set,
> > so for instance at first only FUSE would allow itself to be
> > made user-mountable?
> >
> > A safe thing to do, or overly intrusive?
>
> It goes somewhat against the "no policy in kernel" policy ;). I think
> the warning in the documentation should be enough to make sysadmins
> think twice before doing anything foolish:
Warning in which documentation? A sysadmin considering setting fs_safe
for ext2 or xfs isn't going to be looking at fuse docs, which I think is
what you're talking about. Are you going to add a file under
Documentation/filesystems?
> > +Care should be taken when enabling this, since most
> > +filesystems haven't been designed with unprivileged mounting
> > +in mind.
> > +
>
> BTW, filesystems like 'proc' and 'sysfs' should also be safe, although
> the only use for them being marked safe is if the users are allowed to
> umount them from their private namespace (otherwise a 'mount --bind'
> has the same effect as a new mount).
>
> Thanks,
> Miklos
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-01-22 20:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-01-16 12:31 [patch 00/10] mount ownership and unprivileged mount syscall (v7) Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 01/10] unprivileged mounts: add user mounts to the kernel Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 02/10] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged umount Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 03/10] unprivileged mounts: propagate error values from clone_mnt Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 04/10] unprivileged mounts: account user mounts Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 05/10] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged bind mounts Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 06/10] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged mounts Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 07/10] unprivileged mounts: add sysctl tunable for "safe" property Miklos Szeredi
[not found] ` <20080116123433.126167584-sUDqSbJrdHQHWmgEVkV9KA@public.gmane.org>
2008-01-21 20:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20080121203249.GB5536-6s5zFf/epYLPQpwDFJZrxFMas7LaWZ9n@public.gmane.org>
2008-01-21 21:37 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-22 20:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
[not found] ` <20080122204828.GA1212-6s5zFf/epYLPQpwDFJZrxKsjOiXwFzmk@public.gmane.org>
2008-01-22 22:59 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-23 0:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 08/10] unprivileged mounts: make fuse safe Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-21 20:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 09/10] unprivileged mounts: propagation: inherit owner from parent Miklos Szeredi
[not found] ` <20080116123436.411935940-sUDqSbJrdHQHWmgEVkV9KA@public.gmane.org>
2008-01-21 20:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 10/10] unprivileged mounts: add "no submounts" flag Miklos Szeredi
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2008-02-05 21:36 [patch 00/10] mount ownership and unprivileged mount syscall (v8) Miklos Szeredi
2008-02-05 21:36 ` [patch 07/10] unprivileged mounts: add sysctl tunable for "safe" property Miklos Szeredi
2008-02-06 20:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-02-06 21:11 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-02-06 22:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-02-07 8:09 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-02-07 14:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-02-07 14:36 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-02-07 16:57 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-02-07 15:33 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2008-02-07 16:24 ` Miklos Szeredi
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