From: Matthew Wilcox <matthew@wil.cx>
To: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
hch@infradead.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov, eparis@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
jjohansen@suse.de, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_create
Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2008 06:49:06 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080602124906.GD8562@parisc-linux.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200806021445.13831.agruen@suse.de>
On Mon, Jun 02, 2008 at 02:45:10PM +0200, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
> Without the vfsmount, when something is mounted in more than once place, you
> cannot report which of the name aliases a process is accessing. This is
> unacceptable; the logs would become unusable. With pathname-based, the
> AppArmor and TOMOYO folks really mean pathname-based, not a hybrid pathname /
> mount point model.
audit_getname manages to do this. You're just not thinking hard enough ;-)
> One consequence of this is that pathname-based models must control who is
> allowed to create aliases where, of course.
Absolutely.
--
Intel are signing my paycheques ... these opinions are still mine
"Bill, look, we understand that you're interested in selling us this
operating system, but compare it to ours. We can't possibly take such
a retrograde step."
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-06-02 12:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-05-29 13:49 [patch 00/15] security: pass path instead of inode to security ops Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_create Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-31 8:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-05-31 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-06-01 20:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 6:01 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 7:02 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 9:13 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 9:32 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 9:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 9:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 10:42 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 10:55 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 11:04 ` Pekka Enberg
2008-06-02 11:13 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 15:05 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2008-06-02 15:31 ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-06-02 15:51 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2008-06-02 16:29 ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-06-02 16:52 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2008-06-02 23:37 ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-06-03 6:08 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 18:59 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-06-02 10:04 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2008-06-02 11:23 ` Matthew Wilcox
2008-06-02 11:34 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 11:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 12:32 ` Matthew Wilcox
2008-06-02 12:45 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2008-06-02 12:49 ` Matthew Wilcox [this message]
2008-06-02 13:24 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2008-06-14 8:27 ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-06-03 13:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-06-04 5:09 ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 02/15] security: pass path to inode_mknod Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 03/15] security: pass path to inode_mkdir Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 04/15] security: pass path to inode_rmdir Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 05/15] security: pass path to inode_unlink Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 06/15] security: pass path to inode_symlink Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 07/15] security: pass path to inode_link Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 08/15] security: pass path to inode_rename Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 09/15] security: pass path to inode_setattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 10/15] security: pass path to inode_getxattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 11/15] security: pass path to inode_listxattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 12/15] security: pass path to inode_setxattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 13/15] security: pass path to inode_removexattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 14/15] vfs: more path_permission() conversions Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 15/15] security: pass path to inode_permission Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-30 13:37 ` [patch 00/15] security: pass path instead of inode to security ops Tetsuo Handa
2008-05-30 17:17 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-31 0:33 ` Tetsuo Handa
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