From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Matthew Wilcox Subject: Re: [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_create Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2008 06:49:06 -0600 Message-ID: <20080602124906.GD8562@parisc-linux.org> References: <20080529134903.615127628@szeredi.hu> <20080602123244.GC8562@parisc-linux.org> <200806021445.13831.agruen@suse.de> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: Miklos Szeredi , hch@infradead.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, eparis@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, jjohansen@suse.de, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: Andreas Gruenbacher Return-path: Received: from palinux.external.hp.com ([192.25.206.14]:54286 "EHLO mail.parisc-linux.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755248AbYFBMtI (ORCPT ); Mon, 2 Jun 2008 08:49:08 -0400 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <200806021445.13831.agruen@suse.de> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Mon, Jun 02, 2008 at 02:45:10PM +0200, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > Without the vfsmount, when something is mounted in more than once place, you > cannot report which of the name aliases a process is accessing. This is > unacceptable; the logs would become unusable. With pathname-based, the > AppArmor and TOMOYO folks really mean pathname-based, not a hybrid pathname / > mount point model. audit_getname manages to do this. You're just not thinking hard enough ;-) > One consequence of this is that pathname-based models must control who is > allowed to create aliases where, of course. Absolutely. -- Intel are signing my paycheques ... these opinions are still mine "Bill, look, we understand that you're interested in selling us this operating system, but compare it to ours. We can't possibly take such a retrograde step."