From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" Subject: Re: [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_create Date: Mon, 2 Jun 2008 13:59:53 -0500 Message-ID: <20080602185953.GA14108@us.ibm.com> References: <20080529134958.655985182@szeredi.hu> <20080531083052.GH24135@infradead.org> <20080602060144.GA11564@infradead.org> <20080602091341.GA8011@infradead.org> <20080602093630.GA25254@infradead.org> <20080602104203.GA21898@infradead.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: Miklos Szeredi , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, eparis@redhat.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agruen@suse.de, jjohansen@suse.de, penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp, viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: Christoph Hellwig Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20080602104203.GA21898@infradead.org> Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org Quoting Christoph Hellwig (hch@infradead.org): > On Mon, Jun 02, 2008 at 11:52:52AM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote: > > These patches fix several issues raised at previous submissions: > > > > - passing NULL vfsmounts > > - using nameidata > > - using extra stack for vfsmount argument > > > > So, it seems to me that there's in fact no issues remaining and the > > best excuse you can come up with is that it's a dumb idea. Well, > > that's not a very imressive technical argument IMNSHO. > > Well, pathname based access control is a dumb idea, and we've been > through this N times. You've also been told that vfs_ routines should > remain without vfsmount, and no that's not a stack-related issue no idea > where that part came from. Sorry, noone else asked, so just out of curiosity - the *actual* reason is api layering? Or am I missing another reason? thanks, -serge