From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>,
Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>,
Kenneth Baker <bakerk@metacarta.com>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't)
Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2009 23:36:35 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090329213635.GA21820@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090329060118.GI28946@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
On 03/29, Al Viro wrote:
>
> > In principle, we can mark these threads as "-EAGAIN on such clone()" and
> > clean that on exec failure.
We can't. We can miss the new subthread if we race with clone(CLONE_THREAD).
Unless we add the additional locking, of course.
We can set current->signal->flags |= SIGNAL_DO_NOT_CLONE_FS. But this is
really nasty. For examlpe, what if this flag is already set when
check_unsafe_exec() takes ->siglock ? We should return -ESOMETHING, not
good. Or schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1) until it is cleared?
This also means copy_process()->copy_fs() path should take ->siglock too,
otherwise we we don't have a barrier.
> ... or just do that to fs_struct. After finding that there's no outside
> users. Commenst?
This is even worse. Not only we race with our sub-threads, we race
with CLONE_FS processes.
We can't mark fs_struct after finding that there's no outside users
lockless. Because we can't know whether this is "after" or not, we
can't trust "atomic_read(fs->count) <= n_fs".
Unless we re-use fs_struct->lock. In this case copy_fs() should take
it too. But again, ->fs can be already marked when we enter
check_unsafe_exec().
And btw check_unsafe_exec() seem to have another hole. Another thread
(which shares ->fs with us) can do exit_fs() right before we read
fs->count. Since this thread was already accounted in n_fs, we can
miss the fact we share ->fs with another process.
Perhaps I missed something...
Not that I like this idea (actually I hate), but perhaps we can change
the meaning of LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE,
selinux_bprm_set_creds:
if (new_tsec->sid != old_tsec->sid) {
...
if (avc_has_perm(...))
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
}
Then we modify de_thread(). It sends SIGKILL to all subthreads, this
means that another thread can't clone() after we drop ->siglock. So we
can add this code to the ->siglock protected section
if (unlikely(bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE)) {
if (fs_struct_is_shared())
return -EPERM;
}
...
zap_other_threads();
Oh, ugly.
I'd better hope I missed something ;)
Oleg.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-03-29 21:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-03-28 23:16 [PATCH 1/4] compat_do_execve should unshare_files Hugh Dickins
2009-03-28 23:20 ` [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't Hugh Dickins
2009-03-29 0:53 ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 4:10 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 4:14 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 4:52 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 5:55 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 6:01 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 21:36 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2009-03-29 22:20 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 23:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 0:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 1:08 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 1:13 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 1:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 1:40 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 12:31 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 14:32 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-03-31 6:16 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 0:28 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01 2:38 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 3:03 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 11:25 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:31 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-19 16:30 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:10 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 16:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 17:15 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 17:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 19:39 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:01 ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-23 23:18 ` Roland McGrath
2009-04-23 23:31 ` Al Viro
2009-04-24 11:57 ` [PATCH 3/2] check_unsafe_exec: rcu_read_unlock Hugh Dickins
2009-04-24 14:34 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-24 4:20 ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:02 ` [PATCH 2/2] check_unsafe_exec: s/lock_task_sighand/rcu_read_lock/ Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-23 23:18 ` Roland McGrath
2009-04-24 4:29 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01 11:18 ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:51 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-19 16:44 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:39 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 23:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-31 6:19 ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:21 ` [PATCH 3/4] fix setuid sometimes wouldn't Hugh Dickins
2009-03-29 11:19 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-29 21:48 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 22:37 ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:23 ` [PATCH 4/4] Annotate struct fs_struct's usage count restriction Hugh Dickins
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