From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>,
Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>,
Kenneth Baker <bakerk@metacarta.com>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't)
Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2009 17:51:03 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090406155103.GB21220@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090401023849.GW28946@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
On 04/01, Al Viro wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 01, 2009 at 01:28:01AM +0100, Hugh Dickins wrote:
>
> > Otherwise it looks good to me, except I keep worrying about those
> > EAGAINs.
>
> Frankly, -EAGAIN in situation when we have userland race is fine. And
> we *do* have a userland race here - execve() will kill -9 those threads
> in case of success, so if they'd been doing something useful, they are
> about to be suddenly screwed.
Can't resist! I dislike the "in_exec && -EAGAIN" oddity too.
Yes sure, we can't break the "well written" applications. But imho this
looks strange. And a bit "assymetrical" wrt LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE, I mean
check_unsafe_exec() allows sub-threads to race or CLONE_FS but only if
LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE.
Another reason, we can have the "my test-case found something strange"
bug-reports.
So. Please feel free to nack or just ignore this message, but since I
personally dislike the current behaviour I should at least try to suggest
something else.
- add "wait_queue_head_t in_exec_wait" to "struct linux_binprm".
- kill fs->in_exec, add "wait_queue_head_t *in_exec_wait_ptr"
instead.
- introduce the new helper,
void fs_lock_check_exec(struct fs_struct *fs)
{
write_lock(&fs->lock);
while (unlikely(fs->in_exec_wait_ptr)) {
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
/*
* clone/exec can't succeed, and this
* thread won't return to the user-space
*/
break;
__add_wait_queue(fs->in_exec_wait_ptr, &wait);
__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
write_unlock(&fs->lock);
schedule();
write_lock(&fs->lock);
__remove_wait_queue(&wait);
}
}
Or we can return -EANYTHING when fatal_signal_pending(), this doesn't
matter.
Note that this helper can block only if we race with our sub-thread
in the middle of !LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE exec. Otherwise this is not slower
than write_lock(fs->lock) + if (fs->in_exec) we currently have.
- change copy_fs() to do
if (clone_flags & CLONE_FS) {
fs_lock_check_exec(fs);
fs->users++;
write_unlock(&fs->lock);
return 0;
}
- change check_unsafe_exec:
void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct task_struct *p = current, *t;
unsigned n_fs;
bprm->unsafe = tracehook_unsafe_exec(p);
n_fs = 1;
fs_lock_check_exec(&p->fs);
if (p->fs->in_exec_wait_ptr)
/* we are going to die */
goto out;
rcu_read_lock();
for (t = next_thread(p); t != p; t = next_thread(t)) {
if (t->fs == p->fs)
n_fs++;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (p->fs->users > n_fs) {
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
} else {
bprm->unsafe |= __LSM_EXEC_WAKE;
init_waitqueue_head(&bprm->in_exec_wait);
p->fs->in_exec_wait_ptr = &bprm->in_exec_wait;
}
out:
write_unlock(&p->fs->lock);
}
- and, finally, change do_execve()
/* execve succeeded */
current->fs->in_exec_wait_ptr = NULL;
...
out_unmark:
if (bprm->unsafe & __LSM_EXEC_WAKE) {
write_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
current->fs->in_exec_wait_ptr = NULL;
wake_up_locked(&bprm->in_exec_wait);
write_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
}
Comments?
Oleg.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-04-06 15:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-03-28 23:16 [PATCH 1/4] compat_do_execve should unshare_files Hugh Dickins
2009-03-28 23:20 ` [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't Hugh Dickins
2009-03-29 0:53 ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 4:10 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 4:14 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 4:52 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 5:55 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 6:01 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 21:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 22:20 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 23:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 0:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 1:08 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 1:13 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 1:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 1:40 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 12:31 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 14:32 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-03-31 6:16 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 0:28 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01 2:38 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 3:03 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 11:25 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:31 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-19 16:30 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:10 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 16:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 17:15 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 17:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 19:39 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:01 ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-23 23:18 ` Roland McGrath
2009-04-23 23:31 ` Al Viro
2009-04-24 11:57 ` [PATCH 3/2] check_unsafe_exec: rcu_read_unlock Hugh Dickins
2009-04-24 14:34 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-24 4:20 ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:02 ` [PATCH 2/2] check_unsafe_exec: s/lock_task_sighand/rcu_read_lock/ Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-23 23:18 ` Roland McGrath
2009-04-24 4:29 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01 11:18 ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:51 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2009-04-19 16:44 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:39 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 23:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-31 6:19 ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:21 ` [PATCH 3/4] fix setuid sometimes wouldn't Hugh Dickins
2009-03-29 11:19 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-29 21:48 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 22:37 ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:23 ` [PATCH 4/4] Annotate struct fs_struct's usage count restriction Hugh Dickins
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