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From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>,
	Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>,
	Kenneth Baker <bakerk@metacarta.com>,
	Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't)
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2009 18:39:57 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090421163957.GD5402@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0904191730130.9099@blonde.anvils>

On 04/19, Hugh Dickins wrote:
>
> On Mon, 6 Apr 2009, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> > On 04/01, Al Viro wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, Apr 01, 2009 at 01:28:01AM +0100, Hugh Dickins wrote:
> > >
> > > > Otherwise it looks good to me, except I keep worrying about those
> > > > EAGAINs.
> > >
> > > Frankly, -EAGAIN in situation when we have userland race is fine.  And
> > > we *do* have a userland race here - execve() will kill -9 those threads
> > > in case of success, so if they'd been doing something useful, they are
> > > about to be suddenly screwed.
> >
> > Can't resist! I dislike the "in_exec && -EAGAIN" oddity too.
> >
> > Yes sure, we can't break the "well written" applications. But imho this
> > looks strange. And a bit "assymetrical" wrt LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE, I mean
> > check_unsafe_exec() allows sub-threads to race or CLONE_FS but only if
> > LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE.
> >
> > Another reason, we can have the "my test-case found something strange"
> > bug-reports.
> >
> > So. Please feel free to nack or just ignore this message, but since I
> > personally dislike the current behaviour I should at least try to suggest
> > something else.
>
> I didn't spend very long on this: it looked rather equivalent to the
> current->fs->cred_exec_mutex patch that I proposed, but spinning its
> own infrastructure rather than relying on the existing mutex (and of
> course based on top of Al's patches, now in the tree, which have
> changed the path of least resistance).
>
> I've probably missed subtleties, but I still prefer my own suggestion;
> though Al hinted at a subtle problem with that which I never grasped.

I like your patch more too. Except it has problems with unshare_fs() as
Al pointed out.

I agree, this fs->in_exec_wait_ptr looks really ugly, so...

> Of course I agree with you sharing my unease at -EAGAIN and in_exec.
> Maybe we just lie in wait preparing a "told you so" for when someone
> reports "something strange"!  But I'd really like to see your fix
> patch go in.

Perhaps I'll try to make the patch later, but I am not sure I send it ;)
In any case it complicates the code.

Oleg.


  reply	other threads:[~2009-04-21 16:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-03-28 23:16 [PATCH 1/4] compat_do_execve should unshare_files Hugh Dickins
2009-03-28 23:20 ` [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't Hugh Dickins
2009-03-29  0:53   ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29  4:10     ` Al Viro
2009-03-29  4:14       ` Al Viro
2009-03-29  4:52       ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29  5:55         ` Al Viro
2009-03-29  6:01           ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 21:36             ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 22:20               ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 23:56                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30  0:03                   ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30  1:08                     ` Al Viro
2009-03-30  1:13                       ` Al Viro
2009-03-30  1:36                         ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30  1:40                           ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 12:31                             ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 14:32                               ` Hugh Dickins
2009-03-31  6:16                                 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01  0:28                                   ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01  2:38                                     ` Al Viro
2009-04-01  3:03                                       ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 11:25                                         ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:31                                         ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-19 16:30                                           ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:10                                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 16:31                                               ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 17:15                                                 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 17:35                                                   ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 19:39                                                     ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:01                                                       ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-23 23:18                                                         ` Roland McGrath
2009-04-23 23:31                                                         ` Al Viro
2009-04-24 11:57                                                           ` [PATCH 3/2] check_unsafe_exec: rcu_read_unlock Hugh Dickins
2009-04-24 14:34                                                             ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-24  4:20                                                         ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:02                                                       ` [PATCH 2/2] check_unsafe_exec: s/lock_task_sighand/rcu_read_lock/ Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-23 23:18                                                         ` Roland McGrath
2009-04-24  4:29                                                         ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01 11:18                                       ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:51                                       ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-19 16:44                                         ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:39                                           ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2009-03-30 23:45                               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-31  6:19                                 ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:21 ` [PATCH 3/4] fix setuid sometimes wouldn't Hugh Dickins
2009-03-29 11:19   ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-29 21:48     ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 22:37       ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:23 ` [PATCH 4/4] Annotate struct fs_struct's usage count restriction Hugh Dickins

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