From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Joe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>,
Michael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>,
Kenneth Baker <bakerk@metacarta.com>,
Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2009 01:01:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090423230156.GA31302@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0904212031120.10256@blonde.anvils>
If do_execve() fails after check_unsafe_exec(), it clears fs->in_exec
unconditionally. This is wrong if we race with our sub-thread which
also does do_execve:
Two threads T1 and T2 and another process P, all share the same
->fs.
T1 starts do_execve(BAD_FILE). It calls check_unsafe_exec(), since
->fs is shared, we set LSM_UNSAFE but not ->in_exec.
P exits and decrements fs->users.
T2 starts do_execve(), calls check_unsafe_exec(), now ->fs is not
shared, we set fs->in_exec.
T1 continues, open_exec(BAD_FILE) fails, we clear ->in_exec and
return to the user-space.
T1 does clone(CLONE_FS /* without CLONE_THREAD */).
T2 continues without LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE while ->fs is shared with
another process.
Change check_unsafe_exec() to return res = 1 if we set ->in_exec, and change
do_execve() to clear ->in_exec depending on res.
When do_execve() suceeds, it is safe to clear ->in_exec unconditionally.
It can be set only if we don't share ->fs with another process, and since
we already killed all sub-threads either ->in_exec == 0 or we are the
only user of this ->fs.
Also, we do not need fs->lock to clear fs->in_exec.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
fs/exec.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
fs/compat.c | 11 +++++------
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- PTRACE/fs/exec.c~1_IN_EXEC 2009-04-06 00:03:41.000000000 +0200
+++ PTRACE/fs/exec.c 2009-04-24 00:01:53.000000000 +0200
@@ -1077,9 +1077,11 @@ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binpr
if (p->fs->users > n_fs) {
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
} else {
- if (p->fs->in_exec)
- res = -EAGAIN;
- p->fs->in_exec = 1;
+ res = -EAGAIN;
+ if (!p->fs->in_exec) {
+ p->fs->in_exec = 1;
+ res = 1;
+ }
}
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
@@ -1284,6 +1286,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
struct linux_binprm *bprm;
struct file *file;
struct files_struct *displaced;
+ bool clear_in_exec;
int retval;
retval = unshare_files(&displaced);
@@ -1306,8 +1309,9 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
goto out_unlock;
retval = check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
- if (retval)
+ if (retval < 0)
goto out_unlock;
+ clear_in_exec = retval;
file = open_exec(filename);
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
@@ -1355,9 +1359,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
goto out;
/* execve succeeded */
- write_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
- write_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
current->in_execve = 0;
mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
acct_update_integrals(current);
@@ -1377,9 +1379,8 @@ out_file:
}
out_unmark:
- write_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
- current->fs->in_exec = 0;
- write_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
+ if (clear_in_exec)
+ current->fs->in_exec = 0;
out_unlock:
current->in_execve = 0;
--- PTRACE/fs/compat.c~1_IN_EXEC 2009-04-22 20:49:07.000000000 +0200
+++ PTRACE/fs/compat.c 2009-04-24 00:09:36.000000000 +0200
@@ -1476,6 +1476,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
struct linux_binprm *bprm;
struct file *file;
struct files_struct *displaced;
+ bool clear_in_exec;
int retval;
retval = unshare_files(&displaced);
@@ -1498,8 +1499,9 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
goto out_unlock;
retval = check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
- if (retval)
+ if (retval < 0)
goto out_unlock;
+ clear_in_exec = retval;
file = open_exec(filename);
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
@@ -1546,9 +1548,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
goto out;
/* execve succeeded */
- write_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
- write_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
current->in_execve = 0;
mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
acct_update_integrals(current);
@@ -1568,9 +1568,8 @@ out_file:
}
out_unmark:
- write_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
- current->fs->in_exec = 0;
- write_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
+ if (clear_in_exec)
+ current->fs->in_exec = 0;
out_unlock:
current->in_execve = 0;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-04-23 23:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-03-28 23:16 [PATCH 1/4] compat_do_execve should unshare_files Hugh Dickins
2009-03-28 23:20 ` [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't Hugh Dickins
2009-03-29 0:53 ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 4:10 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 4:14 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 4:52 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 5:55 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 6:01 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 21:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 22:20 ` Al Viro
2009-03-29 23:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 0:03 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 1:08 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 1:13 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 1:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 1:40 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 12:31 ` Al Viro
2009-03-30 14:32 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-03-31 6:16 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 0:28 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01 2:38 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 3:03 ` Al Viro
2009-04-01 11:25 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:31 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-19 16:30 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:10 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 16:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 17:15 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-21 17:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2009-04-21 19:39 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:01 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2009-04-23 23:18 ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Roland McGrath
2009-04-23 23:31 ` Al Viro
2009-04-24 11:57 ` [PATCH 3/2] check_unsafe_exec: rcu_read_unlock Hugh Dickins
2009-04-24 14:34 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-24 4:20 ` [PATCH 1/2] do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread Hugh Dickins
2009-04-23 23:02 ` [PATCH 2/2] check_unsafe_exec: s/lock_task_sighand/rcu_read_lock/ Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-23 23:18 ` Roland McGrath
2009-04-24 4:29 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-01 11:18 ` Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuid sometimes doesn't) Hugh Dickins
2009-04-06 15:51 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-04-19 16:44 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-04-21 16:39 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-30 23:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-03-31 6:19 ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:21 ` [PATCH 3/4] fix setuid sometimes wouldn't Hugh Dickins
2009-03-29 11:19 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-03-29 21:48 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-03-29 22:37 ` Al Viro
2009-03-28 23:23 ` [PATCH 4/4] Annotate struct fs_struct's usage count restriction Hugh Dickins
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