From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: Mike Kazantsev <mk.fraggod@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: POSIX CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH doesn't bypass file read permissions?
Date: Sun, 27 Dec 2009 16:06:10 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20091227220610.GA19083@us.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20091226233012.38d67cf5@coercion>
Quoting Mike Kazantsev (mk.fraggod@gmail.com):
>
> Good day.
>
>
> I'm not sure if it's the right list, but I believe the checks I'm
> bumping against should be done in filesystem code.
>
>
> I haven't used POSIX capabilities until now, and is trying to solve
> classical backup case, when rsync process need to read whole fs, yet I
> don't want to give it any extra privileges or root-level access to
> everything.
>
> CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH seem to be well-suited and sufficient for the task,
> according to docs:
>
> Bypass file read permission checks and directory read and execute
> permission checks.
>
>
> I can see it bypassing directory checks, but it fails to bypass file
> permission check.
>
> For example, following code fails with "Capability: 1, Error: Permission
> denied" on any file with 0000 permissions or, for example,
> "/root/test1" file with 700 permissions, while succeeding for
> "/root/test2" file with 755, with "/root" path having 700 mode and uid
> of test-user is non-root.
> Getcap of a binary gives "= cap_dac_read_search+eip", which is
> consistent with capng_have_capability result.
>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <errno.h>
>
> #include <sys/types.h>
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <fcntl.h>
>
> #include <cap-ng.h>
>
> int main(int argc, char **argv) {
>
> printf( "Capability: %d, ",
> capng_have_capability(CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) );
>
> int fd;
> if ((fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
> printf("Error: %s\n", (char*) strerror(errno));
> return(1); }
> else {
> close(fd);
> return(0); }
>
> };
>
>
> I've tried this code with the same result for ext4, reiserfs and xfs.
> CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE works for bypassing any permissions, but it's not
> quite what I need.
To be sure, are you saying that you've tested with CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and
that works? Are you running with selinux enforcing?
Note my own test on 2.6.33-rc2-00007-g85d1bb6 succeeds...
> Kernel is 2.6.32.2, with CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y and
> security labels enabled for all filesystems that support them.
>
>
> So, now I'm puzzled: is that a normal behavior for this capability?
> Am I doing something wrong?
> Is there a bug in documentation, or prehaps I misinterpreted it?
>
>
> Thanks in advance for shedding any light on this mystery.
>
> --
> Mike Kazantsev // fraggod.net
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-12-27 22:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-12-26 18:30 POSIX CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH doesn't bypass file read permissions? Mike Kazantsev
2009-12-27 22:06 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2009-12-28 5:40 ` Mike Kazantsev
2009-12-28 7:03 ` Mike Kazantsev
2009-12-28 16:22 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-12-28 23:59 ` Mike Kazantsev
2009-12-29 5:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-12-29 11:53 ` Mike Kazantsev
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