From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Andi Kleen Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] security: Yama LSM Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2010 21:10:07 +0200 Message-ID: <20100623191007.GD15787@basil.fritz.box> References: <20100623065236.GH5876@outflux.net> <877hlqas9e.fsf@basil.nowhere.org> <20100623145437.GJ5876@outflux.net> <20100623153408.GA15787@basil.fritz.box> <20100623165936.661744f8@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: Andi Kleen , Kees Cook , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org To: Alan Cox Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20100623165936.661744f8@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org On Wed, Jun 23, 2010 at 04:59:36PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote: > > > I actually think this is a flaw in get_task_comm. (Though actually it's > > > the fault of terminals if they process dangerous escape sequences. Worst > > > case tends to just be confusing output, but that's not important -- > > > nothing should spew non-printables regardless.) Would a patch to > > > get_task_comm be accepted to replace non-printables with "?" or something > > > when filling the buffer? > > > > Probably makes sense, although you might annoy someone who wants Kanji > > process names in UTF-8 or similar. > > The task name is irrelevant, user controlled information. It's not > really ideal for use in security logging. Yes but the pid only is normally completely useless, because nobody knows afterwards what some old pid was. -Andi -- ak@linux.intel.com -- Speaking for myself only.