From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] sanitize task->comm to avoid leaking escape codes
Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2010 20:22:52 -0400
Message-ID: <201006292022.53834.sgrubb@redhat.com>
References: <20100629115957.38BF.A69D9226@jp.fujitsu.com> <201006290858.50387.sgrubb@redhat.com> <20100630084217.38F2.A69D9226@jp.fujitsu.com>
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Cc: Stefani Seibold <stefani@seibold.net>,
	Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@suse.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	Hidetoshi Seto <seto.hidetoshi@jp.fujitsu.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>,
	Dhaval Giani <dhaval.giani@gmail.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
To: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
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On Tuesday, June 29, 2010 08:16:08 pm KOSAKI Motohiro wrote:
> > For the audit system, we want the real, unsanitized task->comm. We record
> > it  in a special format to the audit logs such that unprintable
> > characters are included. We want it exactly this way for certification
> > purposes as well as forensic evidence if someone was playing games. If
> > you do sanitize it for other areas of the kernel, please give us a way
> > to get the unsanitized text.
> 
> Probably this mail is offtopic. I think audit is unrelated with this
> discusstion. because when  forensic, admins shouldn't believe task->comm
> at all. because 1) no path information, perhaps "ls" might mean
> "/home/attackers-dir/evil-script/ls" 2) easily obscured by
> prctl(PR_SET_NAME).

No, its on-topic and we want that information unchanged.


> That said, audit have to logged following two point if task name is
> necessary. 1) exec
> 2) prctl(PRT_SET_NAME)
> 
> Thought ?

The audit system is capable of grabbing that information, too.

-Steve