From: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.s.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 08/20] evm: evm_inode_post_init
Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2011 12:21:00 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110603022100.GA561@dastard> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1307017423-15093-9-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On Thu, Jun 02, 2011 at 08:23:31AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Initialize 'security.evm' for new files. Reduce number of arguments
> by defining 'struct xattr'.
why does this need a new security callout from every filesystem?
Once the security xattr is initialised, the name, len and value is
not going to change so surely the evm xattr can be initialised at
the same time the lsm xattr is initialised.
Then all you need to do in each filesystem is add the evm_xattr
structure to the existing security init call and a:
#ifdef CONFIG_EVM
/* set evm.xattr */
#endif
to avoid adding code that is never executed when EVM is not
configured into the kernel.
That way you don't create the lsm_xattr at all if the evm_xattr is
not created, and then the file creation should fail in an atomic
manner, right? i.e. you don't leave files with unverified security
attributes around when interesting failure corner cases occur (e.g.
ENOSPC).
And while you are there, it's probably also be a good idea to add
support for all filesystems that support xattrs, not just a random
subset of them...
Cheers,
Dave.
--
Dave Chinner
david@fromorbit.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-06-03 2:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-06-02 12:23 [PATCH v6 00/20] EVM Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 01/20] integrity: move ima inode integrity data management Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 02/20] xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 03/20] evm: re-release Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 22:38 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 04/20] evm: add support for different security.evm data types Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 22:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-06-03 12:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 05/20] security: imbed evm calls in security hooks Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 06/20] evm: evm_inode_post_removexattr Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 07/20] evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 08/20] evm: evm_inode_post_init Mimi Zohar
2011-06-03 2:21 ` Dave Chinner [this message]
2011-06-03 5:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2011-06-04 23:50 ` Dave Chinner
2011-06-05 2:46 ` Mimi Zohar
2011-06-07 15:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 09/20] fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 10/20] evm: crypto hash replaced by shash Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 11/20] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in btrfs Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 12/20] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in gfs2 Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 13/20] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in jffs2 Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 14/20] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in jfs Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 15/20] evm: add evm_inode_post_init call in xfs Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 16/20] evm: additional parameter to pass integrity cache entry 'iint' Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 17/20] evm: evm_verify_hmac must not return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 18/20] evm: replace hmac_status with evm_status Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 19/20] evm: permit only valid security.evm xattrs to be updated Mimi Zohar
2011-06-02 12:23 ` [PATCH v6 20/20] evm: add evm_inode_setattr to prevent updating an invalid security.evm Mimi Zohar
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