* [heads-up] mknod() broken on nfs4 @ 2011-06-21 23:59 Al Viro 2011-06-22 0:23 ` Al Viro 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Al Viro @ 2011-06-21 23:59 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Trond Myklebust; +Cc: linux-fsdevel Try mknod(path, 0777, 0); with path leading into nfs4. It leads to call of nfs_open_create(), with nd->intent.open.file being uninitialized. Note that LOOKUP_CREATE is set and so's LOOKUP_EXCL, but LOOKUP_OPEN isn't. So nfs_atomic_lookup() falls through to nfs_lookup(), which sees that we are doing exclusive create and just does d_instantiate(dentry, NULL) and do nothing else. And then we hit ->create()... Results are ugly - random errors (often -EINVAL or -ENOENT) and possibility of memory corruption if we manage to generate a request that won't fail on server. The really interesting question is what should we pass in NFS_PROTO(dir)->create() in open_flags. I suspect that you are checking the wrong flag there (LOOKUP_CREATE instead of LOOKUP_OPEN), but I'm not sure what *should* be passed when LOOKUP_OPEN is not there... ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [heads-up] mknod() broken on nfs4 2011-06-21 23:59 [heads-up] mknod() broken on nfs4 Al Viro @ 2011-06-22 0:23 ` Al Viro [not found] ` <20110622002359.GC11521-3bDd1+5oDREiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org> 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Al Viro @ 2011-06-22 0:23 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Trond Myklebust; +Cc: linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 12:59:00AM +0100, Al Viro wrote: > Try mknod(path, 0777, 0); with path leading into nfs4. It > leads to call of nfs_open_create(), with nd->intent.open.file being > uninitialized. Note that LOOKUP_CREATE is set and so's LOOKUP_EXCL, > but LOOKUP_OPEN isn't. So nfs_atomic_lookup() falls through to > nfs_lookup(), which sees that we are doing exclusive create and just > does d_instantiate(dentry, NULL) and do nothing else. And then > we hit ->create()... > > Results are ugly - random errors (often -EINVAL or -ENOENT) > and possibility of memory corruption if we manage to generate a request > that won't fail on server. > > The really interesting question is what should we pass in > NFS_PROTO(dir)->create() in open_flags. I suspect that you are > checking the wrong flag there (LOOKUP_CREATE instead of LOOKUP_OPEN), > but I'm not sure what *should* be passed when LOOKUP_OPEN is not > there... Argh... Alas, it's not that simple. Even though the code in nfs_open_create() and nfs4_proc_create() seems to imply that passing NULL as ctx is OK and expected, in reality that blows up since we end up with NULL cred passed to nfs4_do_open(), which oopses on attempt to do get_rpccred(NULL) from nfs4_get_state_owner(). Folks, how is that code supposed to work? lookup_instantiate_filp() should *not* be called by vfs_create() triggered by mknod(). And I don't see any codepath in nfs_open_create() that would not step into that. ctx == NULL is the only thing that would skip it and it definitely isn't survivable by nfs4_proc_create(). Moreover, we need the rpc_cred to come from somewhere and nfs4_proc_create() needs to get it from us. BTW, AFAICS fuse will oops in such situation as well... ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
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* Re: [heads-up] mknod() broken on nfs4 [not found] ` <20110622002359.GC11521-3bDd1+5oDREiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org> @ 2011-06-22 23:00 ` Trond Myklebust [not found] ` <1308783620.25875.30.camel-SyLVLa/KEI9HwK5hSS5vWB2eb7JE58TQ@public.gmane.org> 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Trond Myklebust @ 2011-06-22 23:00 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Al Viro Cc: linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-nfs-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA On Wed, 2011-06-22 at 01:23 +0100, Al Viro wrote: > On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 12:59:00AM +0100, Al Viro wrote: > > Try mknod(path, 0777, 0); with path leading into nfs4. It > > leads to call of nfs_open_create(), with nd->intent.open.file being > > uninitialized. Note that LOOKUP_CREATE is set and so's LOOKUP_EXCL, > > but LOOKUP_OPEN isn't. So nfs_atomic_lookup() falls through to > > nfs_lookup(), which sees that we are doing exclusive create and just > > does d_instantiate(dentry, NULL) and do nothing else. And then > > we hit ->create()... > > > > Results are ugly - random errors (often -EINVAL or -ENOENT) > > and possibility of memory corruption if we manage to generate a request > > that won't fail on server. > > > > The really interesting question is what should we pass in > > NFS_PROTO(dir)->create() in open_flags. I suspect that you are > > checking the wrong flag there (LOOKUP_CREATE instead of LOOKUP_OPEN), > > but I'm not sure what *should* be passed when LOOKUP_OPEN is not > > there... > > Argh... Alas, it's not that simple. Even though the code in nfs_open_create() > and nfs4_proc_create() seems to imply that passing NULL as ctx is OK and > expected, in reality that blows up since we end up with NULL cred passed > to nfs4_do_open(), which oopses on attempt to do get_rpccred(NULL) from > nfs4_get_state_owner(). > > Folks, how is that code supposed to work? lookup_instantiate_filp() should > *not* be called by vfs_create() triggered by mknod(). And I don't see any > codepath in nfs_open_create() that would not step into that. ctx == NULL > is the only thing that would skip it and it definitely isn't survivable > by nfs4_proc_create(). Moreover, we need the rpc_cred to come from somewhere > and nfs4_proc_create() needs to get it from us. I agree that we should error out gracefully instead of blowing up, but I fail to see why we want to support mknod for a regular file: it's not a posix interface, nor is it substantially different from open(O_CREAT| O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW). What is it's purpose? > BTW, AFAICS fuse will oops in such situation as well... -- Trond Myklebust Linux NFS client maintainer NetApp Trond.Myklebust-HgOvQuBEEgTQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org www.netapp.com -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
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* Re: [heads-up] mknod() broken on nfs4 [not found] ` <1308783620.25875.30.camel-SyLVLa/KEI9HwK5hSS5vWB2eb7JE58TQ@public.gmane.org> @ 2011-06-22 23:19 ` Al Viro 2011-06-23 2:48 ` Al Viro 2011-06-23 5:37 ` Al Viro 0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Al Viro @ 2011-06-22 23:19 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Trond Myklebust Cc: linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, linux-nfs-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA On Wed, Jun 22, 2011 at 07:00:20PM -0400, Trond Myklebust wrote: > > Folks, how is that code supposed to work? lookup_instantiate_filp() should > > *not* be called by vfs_create() triggered by mknod(). And I don't see any > > codepath in nfs_open_create() that would not step into that. ctx == NULL > > is the only thing that would skip it and it definitely isn't survivable > > by nfs4_proc_create(). Moreover, we need the rpc_cred to come from somewhere > > and nfs4_proc_create() needs to get it from us. > > I agree that we should error out gracefully instead of blowing up, but I > fail to see why we want to support mknod for a regular file: it's not a > posix interface, nor is it substantially different from open(O_CREAT| > O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW). What is it's purpose? It always worked that way, all the way back to Unix v6 (and I'm fairly sure to earlier than that; don't have v5 kernel source, unfortunately). Worked that way in Linux since 0.02/0.03/0.10, when Linus first added mknod(2) (presumably 0.01 had been tested with /dev populated by Minix ;-) As for POSIX, what it says is The only portable use of mknod() is to create a FIFO-special file. If mode is not S_IFIFO or dev is not 0, the behaviour of mknod() is unspecified. and we support it for all non-directories. Always had... Note that the right thing to do is to issue CLOSE and _not_ call lookup_instantiate_filp() if we are called from sys_mknodat(). We don't want to leak stateid... -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [heads-up] mknod() broken on nfs4 2011-06-22 23:19 ` Al Viro @ 2011-06-23 2:48 ` Al Viro 2011-06-23 5:37 ` Al Viro 1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Al Viro @ 2011-06-23 2:48 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Trond Myklebust; +Cc: linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs On Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 12:19:46AM +0100, Al Viro wrote: > It always worked that way, all the way back to Unix v6 (and I'm fairly sure > to earlier than that; don't have v5 kernel source, unfortunately). Worked > that way in Linux since 0.02/0.03/0.10, when Linus first added mknod(2) > (presumably 0.01 had been tested with /dev populated by Minix ;-) After looking around on the net: in v3 kernel, ken/sys2.c: mknod() { int *ip; extern uchar; if(suser()) { ip = namei(&uchar, 1); if(ip != NULL) { u.u_error = EEXIST; goto out; } } if(u.u_error) return; ip = maknode(u.u_arg[1]); ip->i_addr[0] = u.u_arg[2]; out: iput(ip); } IOW, mknod(path, 0777, 0) will, indeed, create a regular file. Root-only, back then. ; ls -l ken/sys2.c -rw-r--r-- 1 al al 3060 Aug 30 1973 ken/sys2.c v3 manpages don't mention mknod(2) at all; it *is* wired in syscall table (syscall 14). Section 2 manpages give syscall numbers; what they have for #14 is makdir (not mentioned by that name in the kernel, described as creating an empty directory with given pathname and mode sans . and .. links - i.e. exactly what mknod(2) did all the way to v7 when given S_IFDIR | something). ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [heads-up] mknod() broken on nfs4 2011-06-22 23:19 ` Al Viro 2011-06-23 2:48 ` Al Viro @ 2011-06-23 5:37 ` Al Viro 1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Al Viro @ 2011-06-23 5:37 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Trond Myklebust; +Cc: linux-fsdevel, linux-nfs On Thu, Jun 23, 2011 at 12:19:46AM +0100, Al Viro wrote: > It always worked that way, all the way back to Unix v6 (and I'm fairly sure > to earlier than that; don't have v5 kernel source, unfortunately). Worked > that way in Linux since 0.02/0.03/0.10, when Linus first added mknod(2) > (presumably 0.01 had been tested with /dev populated by Minix ;-) > > As for POSIX, what it says is > The only portable use of mknod() is to create a FIFO-special file. > If mode is not S_IFIFO or dev is not 0, the behaviour of mknod() is > unspecified. > and we support it for all non-directories. Always had... > > Note that the right thing to do is to issue CLOSE and _not_ call > lookup_instantiate_filp() if we are called from sys_mknodat(). We don't > want to leak stateid... OK... See #untested in vfs-2.6.git; the last 5 commits there. The actual fixes are in the last one; to get rid of the dependency on the previous we'd just need to pass open_flags as additional argument to nameidata_to_nfs_open_context() (like untested@{1}, but without removal of nameidata argument - that part depends on earlier commits and is, IMO, a good idea anyway). It seems to work here. Testing and comments would be welcome... ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2011-06-23 5:37 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2011-06-21 23:59 [heads-up] mknod() broken on nfs4 Al Viro 2011-06-22 0:23 ` Al Viro [not found] ` <20110622002359.GC11521-3bDd1+5oDREiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org> 2011-06-22 23:00 ` Trond Myklebust [not found] ` <1308783620.25875.30.camel-SyLVLa/KEI9HwK5hSS5vWB2eb7JE58TQ@public.gmane.org> 2011-06-22 23:19 ` Al Viro 2011-06-23 2:48 ` Al Viro 2011-06-23 5:37 ` Al Viro
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