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From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Sasha Levin <levinsasha928@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: vfs: INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected
Date: Wed, 9 May 2012 17:12:03 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120509161203.GK22082@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1336577114.3638.23.camel@lappy>

On Wed, May 09, 2012 at 05:25:14PM +0200, Sasha Levin wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> I've started seeing the following warning while fuzzing inside a KVM guest with the latest -next:

[->read() may grab ->cred_guard_mutex, but it may itself be called by
prepare_binprm() after having ->cred_guard_mutex grabbed]

Nasty, that...  What's more, it's not just prepare_binprm() itself -
->load_binary() might end up calling read(); it doesn't have to
limit itself to mmap(), so essentially anything that can be grabbed
by ->read() of a regular file might nest under ->cred_guard_mutex.

	AFAICS, /proc/*/stack, /proc/*/syscall, /proc/*/personality,
/proc/*/io_accounting, /proc/*/auxv, /proc/*/environ, /proc/*/*maps
and /proc/*/pagemap have ->cred_guard_mutex grabbed on read.  seq_file
is a red herring here - io_accounting has the same issue and it does
things directly, without seq_read().

	It's not a realistic attack, fortunately, since you need root
to get past open_exec() on any of those...  Wait.  How _did_ you get
past open_exec(), anyway?  MAY_EXEC is not supposed to be granted on
anything that has no exec bits at all and AFAICS none of those files
have them.

  reply	other threads:[~2012-05-09 16:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-05-09 15:25 vfs: INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected Sasha Levin
2012-05-09 16:12 ` Al Viro [this message]
2012-05-09 16:23   ` Sasha Levin
2012-05-09 16:28     ` Al Viro
2012-05-09 16:36       ` Sasha Levin
2012-05-09 16:37       ` Al Viro
2012-05-09 17:13         ` Sasha Levin
2012-05-09 18:49           ` Dave Jones
2012-05-09 16:25   ` Al Viro

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