From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] warn about unsafe suid_dumpable / core_pattern combo
Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 16:02:04 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120625230204.GA27001@www.outflux.net> (raw)
When suid_dumpable=2, detect unsafe core_pattern settings and warn when
they are seen.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---
fs/exec.c | 10 +++++-----
include/linux/sched.h | 5 +++++
kernel/sysctl.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a6506ba..ddb4c99 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -2002,17 +2002,17 @@ static void coredump_finish(struct mm_struct *mm)
void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
{
switch (value) {
- case 0:
+ case SUID_DUMPABLE_DISABLED:
clear_bit(MMF_DUMPABLE, &mm->flags);
smp_wmb();
clear_bit(MMF_DUMP_SECURELY, &mm->flags);
break;
- case 1:
+ case SUID_DUMPABLE_ENABLED:
set_bit(MMF_DUMPABLE, &mm->flags);
smp_wmb();
clear_bit(MMF_DUMP_SECURELY, &mm->flags);
break;
- case 2:
+ case SUID_DUMPABLE_SAFE:
set_bit(MMF_DUMP_SECURELY, &mm->flags);
smp_wmb();
set_bit(MMF_DUMPABLE, &mm->flags);
@@ -2025,7 +2025,7 @@ static int __get_dumpable(unsigned long mm_flags)
int ret;
ret = mm_flags & MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK;
- return (ret >= 2) ? 2 : ret;
+ return (ret > SUID_DUMPABLE_ENABLED) ? SUID_DUMPABLE_SAFE : ret;
}
int get_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm)
@@ -2142,7 +2142,7 @@ void do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
* so we dump it as root in mode 2, and only into a controlled
* environment (pipe handler or fully qualified path).
*/
- if (__get_dumpable(cprm.mm_flags) == 2) {
+ if (__get_dumpable(cprm.mm_flags) == SUID_DUMPABLE_SAFE) {
/* Setuid core dump mode */
flag = O_EXCL; /* Stop rewrite attacks */
cred->fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; /* Dump root private */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 4059c0f..394d635 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -406,6 +406,11 @@ static inline void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
extern void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value);
extern int get_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm);
+/* get/set_dumpable() values */
+#define SUID_DUMPABLE_DISABLED 0
+#define SUID_DUMPABLE_ENABLED 1
+#define SUID_DUMPABLE_SAFE 2
+
/* mm flags */
/* dumpable bits */
#define MMF_DUMPABLE 0 /* core dump is permitted */
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 4ab1187..b46f496 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -174,6 +174,11 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
#endif
+static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+static int proc_dostring_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ
/* Note: sysrq code uses it's own private copy */
static int __sysrq_enabled = SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE;
@@ -410,7 +415,7 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.data = core_pattern,
.maxlen = CORENAME_MAX_SIZE,
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dostring,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dostring_coredump,
},
{
.procname = "core_pipe_limit",
@@ -1498,7 +1503,7 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
.data = &suid_dumpable,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump,
.extra1 = &zero,
.extra2 = &two,
},
@@ -2009,6 +2014,34 @@ int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv, ¶m);
}
+static void validate_coredump_safety(void)
+{
+ if (suid_dumpable == SUID_DUMPABLE_SAFE &&
+ core_pattern[0] != '/' && core_pattern[0] != '|') {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "Unsafe core_pattern used with "\
+ "suid_dumpable=2. Pipe handler or fully qualified "\
+ "core dump path required.\n");
+ }
+}
+
+static int proc_dointvec_minmax_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int error = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ if (!error)
+ validate_coredump_safety();
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int proc_dostring_coredump(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int error = proc_dostring(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ if (!error)
+ validate_coredump_safety();
+ return error;
+}
+
static int __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(void *data, struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
--
1.7.0.4
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
reply other threads:[~2012-06-25 23:02 UTC|newest]
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