From: Andrey Wagin <avagin@gmail.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] mnt: restrict a number of "struct mnt"
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2013 01:35:32 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130619213532.GA31165@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANaxB-zvPMZe932nAeyOCbdHmmXa76f12BRv0X0W7F0ULZMkTA@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Jun 18, 2013 at 02:56:51AM +0400, Andrey Wagin wrote:
> 2013/6/17 Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>:
> > So for anyone seriously worried about this kind of thing in general we
> > already have the memory control group, which is quite capable of
> > limiting this kind of thing,
>
> > and it limits all memory allocations not just mount.
>
> And that is problem, we can't to limit a particular slab. Let's
> imagine a real container with 4Gb of RAM. What is a kernel memory
> limit resonable for it? I setup 64 Mb (it may be not enough for real
> CT, but it's enough to make host inaccessible for some minutes).
>
> $ mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/test
> $ echo $((64 << 20)) > /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/test/memory.kmem.limit_in_bytes
> $ unshare -m
> $ echo $$ > /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/test/tasks
> $ mount --make-rprivate /
> $ mount -t tmpfs xxx /mnt
> $ mount --make-shared /mnt
> $ time bash -c 'set -m; for i in `seq 30`; do mount --bind /mnt
> `mktemp -d /mnt/test.XXXXXX` & done; for i in `seq 30`; do wait;
> done'
> real 0m23.141s
> user 0m0.016s
> sys 0m22.881s
>
> While the last script is working, nobody can't to read /proc/mounts or
> mount something. I don't think that users from other containers will
> be glad. This problem is not so significant in compared with umounting
> of this tree.
>
> $ strace -T umount -l /mnt
> umount("/mnt", MNT_DETACH) = 0 <548.898244>
> The host is inaccessible, it writes messages about soft lockup in
> kernel log and eats 100% cpu.
Eric, do you agree that
* It is a problem
* Currently we don't have a mechanism to prevent this problem
* We need to find a way to prevent this problem
>
>
> >
> > Is there some reason we want to go down the path of adding and tuning
> > static limits all over the kernel? As opposed to streamlining the memory
> > control group so it is low overhead and everyone that cares can use it?
>
> The memory control group doesn't help in this case... I need to look
> at this code in more details, maybe we can limit a depth of nested
> mount points.
Complexity of the umount algorithm does not depends on a depth of nested
mounts, it depends on a number of mounts and sometimes complexity is O(n^2).
For example:
mount -t tmpfs xxx /mnt
mount --make-shared /mnt
mkdir /mnt/tmp
mount -t tmpfs xxx /mnt/tmp
mkdir /mnt/d
for ((i = 0; i < $1; i++)); do
d=`mktemp -d /mnt/d/xxx.XXXXXX`
mount --bind /mnt/tmp $d || break
done
mkdir /mnt/tmp/d
for ((i = 0; i < $1; i++)); do
d=`mktemp -d /mnt/tmp/xxx.XXXXXX`
mount --bind /mnt/tmp/d $d || break
done
perf data for umount -l /mnt
29.60% dbus-daemon [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __ticket_spin_lock
|
--- __ticket_spin_lock
lg_local_lock
path_init
path_openat
do_filp_open
do_sys_open
SyS_openat
system_call_fastpath
__openat64_nocancel
0x747379732f312d73
20.20% umount [kernel.kallsyms] [k] propagation_next
|
--- propagation_next
|
|--65.35%-- umount_tree
| SyS_umount
| system_call_fastpath
| __umount2
| __libc_start_main
|
--34.65%-- propagate_umount
umount_tree
SyS_umount
system_call_fastpath
__umount2
__libc_start_main
17.81% umount [kernel.kallsyms] [k] __lookup_mnt
|
--- __lookup_mnt
|
|--82.78%-- propagate_umount
| umount_tree
| SyS_umount
| system_call_fastpath
| __umount2
| __libc_start_main
|
--17.22%-- umount_tree
SyS_umount
system_call_fastpath
__umount2
__libc_start_main
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-06-19 21:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-06-17 8:24 [PATCH] [RFC] mnt: restrict a number of "struct mnt" Andrey Vagin
2013-06-17 19:58 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-06-17 22:56 ` Andrew Morton
2013-06-18 6:09 ` Andrew Vagin
2013-06-17 22:56 ` Andrey Wagin
2013-06-19 21:35 ` Andrey Wagin [this message]
2013-06-21 1:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
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